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STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
1 










Ada County Docket # 2005-561 
I The Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court October 24, 2008. A 
Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record was filed July 5, 2007 in related appeal No. 32689, 
Esquivel v. State; therefore good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that this Court shall take JUDICIAL NOTICE of the 
Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript filed in prior appeal No. 32689, Esquivel v. State. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare and file a 
LIMITED CLERK'S RECORD with this Court, which shall' contain the documents requested in 
the Notice of Appeal, together with a copy of this Order, but shall not duplicate any documents 
filed in prior appeal No. 32689. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Reporter shall prepare and 
lodge a SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT, which shall include the proceedings 
requested in the Notice of Appeal, but shall not duplicate any proceedings included in the 
Reporter's Transcript filed in prior appeal No. 32689. The LIMITED CLERK'S RECORD and 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT shall be filed with this Court after settlement. 
DATED this 10" day of November 2008. 
For the Supreme Court 
A 
Stephen ~ f h y o q  Clerk t o  
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
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STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 




Petitioner, Carlos Esquivel, moves this Court for an order appointing him coutlsel to 
represent him in this post-conviction proceeding. 
This motion is made pursuant to I.C. 19-4904 and the Court of Appeals's decision in 
Esquivel v. State, 2007 Unpublished Decision No. 541 (August 3, 2007), which "reverse[d] in 
part [this Court's] order dismissing Esquivel's application for post-conviction relief' and further 
"remand[ing] the case to the district court for further proceedings, wherein the district court is 
instructed to appoint counsel to assist Esquivel in pursuing his single, potentially valid claim." 
Slip Op., at 8. (A copy of the unpublished opinion is attached as Exhibit A.) The Remittitur, 
which was issued on August 28, 2007, ordered "that the District Court shall forthwith conlply 
1 MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
with the directive of the unpublished Opinion[.]" (A copy of the Remittitur is attached as Exhibit 
Respectfully submitted this 29Ih day of August, 2007. 
&- - 
Dennis Benjamin 
(Appointed Counsel on Appeal) 
for Carlos Esquivel 
2 MOTlON FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
00008 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 





to: Jean Fisher 
Deputy Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Ada County Courthouse 
Boise. ID 83702 
- 
Dennis ~ e n j & i n  
3 MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
AUG 0 6 2007 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 




STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 2007 Unpublished Opinion No. 541 
) Filed: August 3,2007 
) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 
) OPINION AND SHALL NOT 
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada 
County. Hon. Cheri C. Copsey, District Judge. 
Order summarily dismissing application for post-conviction relief, affirmed 
part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP, Boise, for appellant. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Ralph R. Blount, Deputy Attorney 
General, Boise, for respondent. 
PERRY, Chief Judge 
Carlos Esquivel appeals from the district court's order summarily dismissing his 
application for post-conviction relief. Specifically, Esquivel challenges the district court's denial 
of his request for appointment of counsel and the adequacy of the district court's notice of intent 
to dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for 
further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
Esquivel was charged with three counts of lewd conduct with a minor under the age o f '  
sixteen, I.C. 5 18-1508, and one count of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen, I.C. 5 
18-1 506. At the completion of trial, a jury found him guilty of all charges. Prior to sentencing, 
the district court ordered Esquivel to undergo a psychosexual evaluation to be conducted by a 
psychologist. The results of Esquivel's psychosexual evaluation were included in the 
presentence investigation report (PSI) and considered by the district court at sentencing. 
Esquivel was sentenced to concurrent unified terms of thirty years, with minimum periods of 
confinement of fifteen years, for lewd conduct and a concurrent unified term of fifteen years, 
with a minimum period of confinement of five years, for sexual abuse. Esquivel filed an 
I.C.R. 35 motion which was denied by the district court. On appeal, this Court affirmed 
Esquivel's judgment of conviction, sentences, and the district court's denial of his Rule 35 
motion in an unpublished opinion. State v. Esquivel, Docket No. 30424 (Ct. App. Dec. 2,2004). 
Esquivel filed an application for post-conviction relief seeking a vacation of his judgment 
of conviction and a new trial. Esquivel's application alleged sixteen distinct claims of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel and one claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 
Esquivel also requested that the district court appoint an attorney to represent him in his post- 
conviction claims. The district court denied Esquivel's request for appointment of an attorney, 
holding that his claims were frivolous and without merit. Esquivel then filed an amended 
application for post-conviction relief with only six of the original claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel alleged. Esquivel also renewed his request for the appointment of an attorney. The 
district court again denied Esquivel's request for an attorney. 
The district court filed a notice of intent to dismiss Esquivel's application for post- 
conviction relief and gave both Esquivel and the state twenty days to respond. Neither Esquivel 
nor the state responded and, more than two months later, the district court dismissed Esquivel's 
application. Esquivel appeals. 
11. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is civil in nature. 
State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678,662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827, 
830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921, 828 P.2d 1.323, 1326 (Ct. 
App. 1992). Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of 
evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. I.C. $ 19- 
4907; Russell v. State, 11 8 Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.Zd 654, 656 (Ct. App. 1990). An application for 
post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. An application must 
contain much more than "a short and plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a 
complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). Rather, an application for post-conviction relief must be 
verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, 
records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the application must 
state why such supporting evidence is not included with the application. I.C. 5 19-4903. In 
other words, the application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting 
its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal. 
Idaho Code Section 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post- 
conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. 
Summary dismissal of an application pursuant to I.C. 5 19-4906 is the procedural equivalent of 
summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56. Summary dismissal is permissible only when the 
applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the 
applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. If such a factual issue is 
presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763, 819 
P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct. App. 1991); Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458, 459 (Ct. 
App. 1988); Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 89, 741 P.2d 374, 376 (Ct. App. 1987). Summary 
dismissal of an application for post-conviction relief may be appropriate, however, even where 
the state does not controvert the applicant's evidence because the court is not required to accept 
either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the 
applicant's conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,647, 873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct. App. 
1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156,159,715 P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1986). 
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary 
hearing, we determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions, 
and admissions together with any affidavits on file; moreover, the court liberally construes the 
facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 
896,865 P.2d 985,987 (Ct. App. 1993). 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the post- 
conviction procedure act. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25, 828 P.2d 1323, 1329-30 (Ct. 
, App. 1992). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show 
that the attorney's performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by the 
deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1 984); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 
3 13, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct. App. 1995). To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the 
burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. Aragon v. Stute, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). To establish 
prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient 
performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 
P.2d at 1177. 
111. 
ANALYSIS 
On appeal, Esquivel asserts the district court erred in denying his request for appointment 
of counsel. Esquivel argues that two of his post-conviction ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims--counsel's failure to request a polygraph and an independent psychosexual evaluation-- 
were valid and merited the assistance of counsel to pursue. Furthermore, Esquivel also argues 
that the district court's notice of intent to dismiss did not address the grounds for the dismissal of 
one of his claims. 
A. Appointment of Counsel 
If a post-conviction applicant is unable to pay for the expenses of representation, the trial 
court may appoint counsel to represent the applicant in preparing the application, in the trial 
court and on appeal. I.C. § 19-4904. The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed 
counsel lies within the discretion of the district court. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 
102 P.3d 1 108, 11 1 1 (2004). When a district court is presented with a request for appointed 
counsel, the court must address this request before ruling on the substantive issues in the case. 
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 102 P.3d at 11 1 1; Fox v. State, 129 Idaho 881, 885, 934 P.2d 
947, 951 (Ct. App. 1997). The district court abuses its discretion where it fails to determine 
whether an applicant for post-conviction relief is entitled to court-appointed counsel before 
denying the application on the merits. See Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1 1 12. 
In determining whether to appoint counsel pursuant to Section 19-4904, the district court 
should determine if the applicant is able to afford counsel and whether the situation is one in 
which counsel should be appointed to assist the applicant. Id. In its analysis, the district court 
should consider that applications filed by a pro se applicant may be conclusory and incomplete. 
See id., at 792-93, 102 P.3d at 11 11-12. Facts sufficient to state a claim may not be alleged 
because they do not exist or because the pro se applicant does not know the essential elements of 
a claim. Id Some claims are so patently fiivolous that they could not be developed into viable 
claims even with the assistance of counsel. Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491, 493, 95 P.3d 642, 
644 (Ct. App. 2004). However, if an applicant alleges facts that raise the possibility of a valid 
claim, the district court should appoint counsel in order to give the applicant an opportunity to 
work with counsel and properly allege the necessary supporting facts. Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 
793, 102 P.3d at 11 12. 
I. Polygraph examination 
Esquivel asserts the district court erred in denying his request for appointment of counsel 
to assist him in his post-conviction claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to arrange 
for him to undergo a polygraph examination. On appeal, Esquivel admits that the results of a 
polygraph examination would not have been admissible at trial. Instead, Esquivel argues that a 
favorable polygraph examination might have resulted in the state offering an acceptable plea 
agreement or the sentencing court may have given him a lesser sentence. 
Initially, we note that Esquivel's first application appears to indicate his claim is 
challenging his trial counsel's failure to obtain a polygraph test to use at trial. In contrast, the 
issues Esquivel raises on appeal clearly challenge his trial counsel's failure to obtain polygraph 
results for potential use during pre-trial negotiations or at sentencing. Generally, issues not 
raised below may not be considered for the first time on appeal. State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 
195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1 992). However, Esquivel's amended application briefly mentions that 
favorable polygraph results may have also been utilized at sentencing. Nowhere, though, does 
Esquivel's amended petition challenge his trial counsel's efforts, or lack thereof, to obtain a plea 
agreement. Accordingly, we now consider only the sentencing issues he raises on appeal as 
related to the specific post-conviction claim of counsel's failure to arrange for Esquivel to take a 
polygraph exam. 
In reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, this Court has long adhered to the 
proposition that tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on 
appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or 
other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 23 1, 233, 880 
P.2d 261, 263 (Ct. App. 1994). Not introducing the results of an already existing, favorable 
polygraph examination at sentencing, in a child sexual abuse case, can be considered a tactical 
decision as such defendants often receive harsher sentences for refusing responsibility. See 
Fodge v. State, 125 Idaho 882,887,876 P.2d 164,169 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Here, considering the substantial evidence against Esquivel, the record does not indicate 
that the results of a polygraph test likely would have been favorable, or that the failure to obtain 
such an examination prejudiced his sentencing. Even if Esquivel's trial counsel had obtained a 
favorable polygraph examination of Esquivel, no facts are alleged in his application, or 
established in the record, indicating such results would have had a positive effect on h s  
sentencing. Moreover, even a favorable polygraph result could potentially have a negative effect 
on Esquivel's sentencing if the district court chose to view such evidence, after a finding of guilt 
at trial, as indicative of Esquivel refbsing to accept responsibility for his crimes. 
Therefore, the decision whether to obtain a polygraph examination of Esquivel, after he 
had been found guilty by the jury, was a tactical decision that cannot form the basis for a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel. Esquivel's application provided no facts that would raise the 
possibility of a valid claim and, accordingly, the district court did not err in denying appointment 
of counsel to assist him in pursuing this claim. 
2. Psychosexual evaluation 
Esquivel asserts the district court erred in denying his request for appointment of counsel 
to assist him in his post-conviction claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
properly challenge the psychosexual evaluation used against him after Esquivel requested trial 
counsel to do so. A psychosexual evaluation conducted for sentencing purposes is considered a 
critical stage of the defendant's case. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 562, 149 P.3d 833, 837 
(2006). Therefore, a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel's advice regarding his 
or her participation in an evaluation. Id. at 558-59, 149 P.3d at 837-38. Trial counsel's failure to 
properly advise a defendant regarding his or her Fifth Amendment rights in submitting to a 
psychosexual evaluation may amount to deficient performance. See id at 564, 149 P.3d at 839. 
When there is a reasonable probability that the sentence would be different had the psychosexual 
evaluation not been included, or had been more favorable to the defendant, a trial counsel's 
deficient performance may also be prejudicial. See Wood, 132 Idaho at 101, 967 P.2d at 715; 
Estrada, 143 Idaho at 565, 149 P.3d at 840. 
Esquivel's application alleges facts indicating the possibility that his court-ordered 
psychosexual evaluation was inadequately conducted and that he voiced his concerns about the 
evaluation to  his trial counsel. Esquivel's application, in essence, claims his triql counsel was 
deficient for failing to either question the conduct of the expert who performed the evaluation or 
request that a different expert conduct a new psychosexual evaluation. The record before this 
Court on appeal demonstrates that the results of Esquivel's psychosexual evaluation were 
considered by the district court in making its sentencing decision and was a factor contributing to 
the length of his sentence. 
Esquivel's application does not set forth all the elements necessary to succeed in an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, nor is his claim clearly or artfully worded. However, in 
seeking appointment of counsel to assist him in pursuing a post-conviction claim, Esquivel does 
not need to posit a complete claim in his application because it is understood that a pro se 
applicant rarely has the skill or knowledge to do so. See Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792-93, 102 
P.3d at 11 11-12. Instead, Esquivel's application needed only to allege facts that might possibly 
give rise to a valid claim. See id. at 793, 102 P.3d at 11 12. While we offer no opinion on the 
appropriateness of his trial counsel's conduct the facts alleged by Esquivel, combined with the , . .i.. ) " , 8 $1 ., .- , , ;( . + L -.' 3?2 .. ,- 
recor&raises thepawfbfliry of a valid claim1Wo counsel's inaction regarding the psychosexual 
, . - .  3 " , '$"?*  
evalu&an - ~ ~ h w T ! ~ \ m a ~ c 8 1 2 c I u d e t  that &e*district court erred in denying the request for 
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appointmen&,af,cguns& L -- totpmtr&.this. speatfi~post-conviction claim. Accordingly, we reverse 
the district court's summary dismissal and denial of counsel as to this claim. On remand, we 
instkt- 'de disbict ' c o d  to 3f$iOidic&mser t6 assist Esquivel in pursuing the post-conviction 
claim tht.'his- counsel was ineffectiw irr idling to arrange an independent psychosexual 
evaluation or otherwise mitigate the effects of the court-ordered evaluation. 
B. Notice of Intent to Dismiss 
On appeal, Esquivel also argues that the district court's notice of intent to dismiss failed 
to address the deficiencies in his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to arrange an 
independent psychosexual evaluation. However, we have already concluded that the facts 
alleged in Esquivel's application regarding this issue raised the possibility of a valid claim. As a 
result, the district court erred in denying appointment of counsel to assist Esquivel, and we 




The district court did not err in denying appointment of counsel to assist Esquivel in his 
post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon counsel's failure to request 
7 QOCb4.6 
Esquivel undergo a polygraph examination. Esquivel's application does, however, allege facts 
which raise the possibility of a valid ineffective assistance of counsel claim in regard to his 
psychosexual evaluation. Therefore, the district court erred in denying Esquivel's request for 
appointment of counsel to assist him in pursuing this claim. Accordingly, we affirm in part and 
reverse in part the district court's order dismissing Esquivel's application for post-conviction 
relief. Furthermore, we remand this case to the district court for futher proceedings, wherein the 
district court is instructed to appoint counsel to assist Esquivel in pursing his single, potentially 
valid claim. No costs or fees are awarded to either party on appeal. 
Judge LANSING and Judge GUTIERREZ, CONCUR. 
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TO: FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF ADA. 
The Court having announced its unpublished Opinion in this cause August 3, 
2007, which has now become final; therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the District Court shall forthwith comply with 
the directive of the unpublished Opinion, if any action is required. 
DATE; this z$ day of August, 2007. 
Clerk ofthe Court of ~ p @ s  
STATE OF IDAHO 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Judge 
STEPHEN W. KENYON 
i s [ , : F i v e ? ;  
h:iO 'I y LihT/ 
Ada County Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
dk/ 
NO. SPOT 0 5 0 m  
ORDER APPOINTING 
COUNSEL 
The Court, having considered the Court of Appeals's decision in this case (Esquivel v. 
State, 2007 Unpublished Opinion No. 541, issued on August 3, 2007) and the Remittitur of that 
Court, issued on August 28,2007, it is hereby ordered that conflict counsel, as assigned by the 
Ada County Public Defenders, be and hereby is appointed to represent the petitioner. 
4- 
Dated this 3 day of % , 2007. 
&+, 
Hon. Cheri C. Copsey 6 
District Judge 
1 ORDER APPOINTING COUNSEL 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Jean M. Fisher 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Room 3 191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: 287-7700 
Fax: 287-7709 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 







1 Case No. SPOT 0500561 
1 
1 RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO 
1 RELEASE DEFENSE FILE TO 
1 THE STATE FOR UPCPA 
) ACTION 
) 
COMES NOW, Jean M. Fisher, Deputy Ada County Prosecutor, and files this Motion 
requesting the Court to Order the public defender's office to officially waive the attorney-client 
privilege and to turn-over the original defense case file to the State for the underlying criminal 
case in H0300476. There is a pending UPCPA action involving the single issue regarding 
ineffective assistance of counsel in regard to the psychosexual evaluation. 
Respondent's Motion for Release the Public Defender's File to the State(Esquive1 v. 
State of Idaho, SPOT 0500516), Page 1 
0 0 0 ~ 0  
In order for the State to effectively prepare for this matter, the State needs to access to the 
public defender's file and to open communication with the defense attorney, Eric Rolfsen, in this 
matter. 
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of October, 2007. 
Deputy Ada County Prosecutor 
Respondent's Motion for Release the Public Defender's File to the State(Esquive1 v. 
State of Idaho, SPOT 0500516), Page 2 
oclnz3.l 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on this d d a y  October 2007, I provided a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing to: J. Layne Davis, Attorney at Law, 200 N. 4TH 
ST., STE. 302, BOISE, ID 83702, by faxing to (208) 429-1 100 and then mailing via 
United States mail, postage prepaid. 
Respondent's Motion to Release the Public Defender's File to the State 
(Esquivel v. State of Idaho, SPOT 0500561), Page 3 
00022 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Jean M. Fisher 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Room 3 191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: 287-7700 
Fax: 287-7709 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 







) Case No. SPOT 0500561 
) 
) ORDER WAIVING 
1 CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE 
1 PUBLIC DEFENDER AND THE 
) CRIMINAL FILE IN H0300476 
1 
The Petitioner, having raised an issue of ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a post- 
conviction relief action involving the petitioner's participation in a psychosexual evaluation, this 
Court ORDERS that the public defender's criminal file in H0300476 be copied andlor made 
available to the Ada County Prosecutor's Office. The Court orders that the attomeylclient 
Order Waiving Confiidentiality (Esquivel v. State of Idaho, SPOT 0500561), Page 1 
privilege is hereby waived as to the public defender's representation of Carlos Esquivel in all 
matters relating to the H0300476 criminal case. 
Tr hw 
Dated this 13 day of Ckbber, 2007. 
GLtL-srr, 
District Court Judge 
Order Waiving Confidentiality (Esquivel v. State of Idaho, SPOT 0500561), Page 2 
Layne Davis 
DAVIS & WALKER 
200 North 4th Street, Suite 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 429- 1200 
Facsimile: (208) 429-1 100 
Idaho State Bar No. 4640 
J. DAVID NAVARAO, Clark 
By J. EARLE 
DmJrY 
Conflict Counsel for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CARLOS ESQUIVEL, ) 
1 Case No. SPOT0500561 
Petitioner, 1 
) SECOND AMENDED PETITION 
VS. 1 AND AFFIDAVIT FOR POST 
1 CONVICTION RELIEF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, Carlos Esquivel, by and through his attorney of record, 
Layne Davis of Davis & Walker, and pursuant to Idaho Code $9 19-4903 and 19-4906, amends 
the Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief filed on or about July 15,2005. 
The proceeding in which the Petitioner was convicted is State of Idaho vs. Carlos 
Esquivel, Ada County Case No. H0300476. The Petitioner filed an Amended Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief on or about August 15,2005, which was summarily dismissed. On January 
23,2006, the Petitioner appealed the courts summary dismissal of the Petitioner's Amended Post 
Conviction Petition. 
SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - Page 1 
00025 
The Court of Appeals issued its unpublished opinion #541 on August 8,2007, which 
affirmed a portion of the court's Summary Dismissal, reversed the Dismissal as to one remaining 
issue, and remanded back to the District Court for further proceedings. 
This Second Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief addresses the sole issue of the 
Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim with regard to the psychosexual evaluation 
contained in the Presentence report, dated January 6,2004. 
The Petitioner alleges the following grounds upon which the application is based: 
1. Ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that his trial 
counsel's failure to properly advise him regarding his Fifth Amendment Rights in submitting to a 
psychosexual evaluation amounted to deficient performance. A psychosexual evaluation 
conducted for sentencing purposes is considered a critical stage of the Defendant's case. Estrada 
vs. State 143 Idaho 558, 149#P.3d#833(2006). Petitioner asserts that he voiced his concerns 
about the evaluation to his trial counsel, and his trial counsel failed to question the conduct of the 
expert who performed the evaluation, to request a different expert to conduct a psychosexual 
evaluation, independently of Doctor Robert Engle, or to advise Petitioner he could have simply 
chosen not to participate at all in the evaluation. 
The evaluation by Dr. Engle, among other things, indicates the Petitioner to not be a 
candidate for outpatient sex offender treatment, in part because of the Petitioner's denial during 
the examination, that he had sexually abused the alleged victim in the substantive case. 
The Sentencing Court relied on the evaluation in part in its sentencing decision, and as a 
result, trial counsel's deficient performance provides the basis for Petitioners application in this 
instance. 
2. The conviction and its sentence is in violation of the Constitution of The United 
States andlor the Constitution of the laws of The State of Idaho. 
SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - Page 2 
C ~ l ) ~ Z ~  
3. Trial counsel's deficient performance, requires vacating the sentence in the 
interest of justice. 
4. This Second Amended Petition is supported by the original Petition for Post 
Conviction and First Amended Petition, previously on file, and is incorporated herein by 
reference as if fully set forth herein. 
DATED this 3 1 day of January, 2008. 
DAVIS & WALKER 
Lz&ne Davis 
Conflict Counsel for Petitioner 
SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - Page 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the i3 1 day of January, 2008, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
DAVIS & WALKER 
Ada County Prosecutor 
200 W. Front St., Rrn. 3191 
Boise, ID 83702 
lAi 
~ a $  Davis 













GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Jean M. Fisher 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Room 3 191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: 287-7700 
Fax: 287-7709 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CARLOS ESQUIVEL , 
Petitioner, 
VS. 






Case No. SPOT 0 5 0 0 m  
1 
1 Respondent's Answer to the 
1 Second Amended Petition for Post 
1 Conviction Relief 
1 
1 
1. As to paragraph one, the State admits that defense counsel at trial did not advise the 
petitioner of his Fifth Amendment Right regarding the psychosexual evaluation; The 
State, however, denies that the failure to do so was so deficient as to change the outcome 
of the petitioner's sentencing; 
2. As to paragraph two, the State denies that the conviction and the sentence violated the 
Constitution of the United States; 
3. As to paragraph three, the State denies that there was such deficient performance as to 
disrupt the original sentence; 
4. The State denies that the second amended petition is supported by appropriate legal 
documentation, affidavit or law to support post conviction relief. 
State's Answer to Second Amended Motion for Post Conviction Relief 
(SPOT0500561), Page 1 
The State respectfully requests that this second motion for relief be summarily denied. The State 
shall a brief in support of this motion for dismissal. 
t lw 
Respectfully submitted t h i d d a y  of February, 2008. 
bean M. Fisher 
Deputy Ada County Prosecutor 
State's Answer to Second Amended Motion for Post Conviction Relief 
(SPOT0500561), Page 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this @ day February 2008, I provided a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing to: Layne Davis Attorney at Law, 200 North 4th 
St., Ste. 302, Boise, ID 83702, by depositing in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid. 
State's Answer to Second Amended Motion for Post Conviction Relief 
(SPOT0500561), Page 3 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By J. EARLE 
aEPLlrY 
Jean M. Fisher 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Room 3 19 1 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: 287-7700 
Fax: 287-7709 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTNCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CARLOS ESQUIVEL , 
Petitioner, 
VS. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent 
1 
) Case No. SPOT 0500 
1 
1 Respondent's Brief in Support of 




COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Jean M. Fisher, Deputy Ada County 
Prosecutor, and does hereby provide this brief in support of the state's motion for summary 
dismissal of Carlos Esquivel's second amended petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to 
Idaho Code 19-4906(c). 
I. 
Factual And Procedural History 
Esquivel was charged and convicted by a jury of three counts of lewd conduct with a minor 
and one count of sexual abuse of a minor under sixteen. Before sentencing, he was ordered to 
obtain a psychosexual evaluation for sentencing. The basic facts are as set forth by the Idaho 
State's Brief in Support of Summary Dismissal (Esquivel, SPOT 0500516D) 
4 
9ocnz 
Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion number 541 filed Augus 3,2007 under Docket number 
32689. 
On January 3 1,2008, Esquivel filed the instant second amended petition for post- 
conviction relief. The state filed an answer on February 8, 2008 and a motion to take judicial 
notice of the record, transcripts, and exhibits in the underlying criminal case. Presently, the state 
has filed a motion for summary dismissal and this brief in support of the state's motion for 
summary dismissal. 
II. 
Applicable Legal Standards 
A. General Standards 
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature. 
State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676,678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827, 
830,452 P.2d 54,57 (1969); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918,921, 828 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct. 
App. 1992). An application for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary 
civil action, however, an application must contain much more than "a short and plain statement 
of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). Martinez v. State, 126 
Idaho 8 13, 8 16, 892 P.2d 488,491 (Ct. App. 1995). Rather, an application for post-conviction 
relief must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and 
affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the 
application must state why such supporting evidence is not included with the application. I.C. 5 
19-4903. Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of 
evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. I.C. 4 19- 
4907; Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65,67, 794 P.2d 654, 656 (Ct. App. 1990). 
State's Brief in Support of Summary Dismissal (Esquivel, SPOT 05005161)) 
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The post-conviction petitioner must make factual allegations showing each essential 
element of the claim, and a showing of admissible evidence must support those factual 
allegations. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,647,873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct. App. 1994); Drapeau v. 
State, 103 Idaho 6 12,617,65 1 P.2d 546,65 1 (Ct. App. 1982); Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822, 
824, 702 P.2d 860, 862 (Ct. App. 1985). The district court may take judicial notice of the record 
of the underlying criminal case. Hays v. State, 113 Idaho 736, 739, 745 P.2d 758, 761 (Ct. App. 
1987), affd 115 Idaho 315, 766 P.2d 785 (1988), overruled on other grounds State v. Guzman, 
122 Idaho 98 1,842 P.2d 660 (1992). 
B. Lena1 Standards Applicable To Esquivel's Burden Of Making Out A Prima Facie Case Of 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must demonstrate 
both that (a) his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and 
(b) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings 
would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687-88 (1984); LaBelle v. 
State, 130 Idaho 11 5, 118, 937 P.2d 427,430 (Ct. App. 1997). "Because of the distorting effects 
of hindsight in reconstructing the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, there is a strong 
presumption that counsel's performance was w i t h  the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance -- that is, 'sound trial strategy."' Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,406,775 P.2d 1243, 
1248 (Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90); Ara~on v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 
760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). A petitioner must overcome a strong presumption that counsel 
"rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable 
professional judgment" to establish that counsel's performance was "outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance." Claiboume v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1377 (9th Cir.1995) 
(quoting, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). 
State's Brief in Support of Summary Dismissal (Esquivel, SPOT 05005163)) 
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Thus, the first element - deficient performance - "requires a showing that counsel made 
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by 
the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064,80 L. Ed. 2d at 693. The second element 
- prejudice - requires a showing that counsel's deficient performance actually had an adverse 
effect on his defense; i.e., but for counsel's deficient performance, there was a reasonable 
probability the outcome of the trial would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693; 
Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999). Regarding the second 
element, Esquivel has the burden of showing that his trial counsels' deficient conduct "so 
undermined the proper hctioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as 
having produced a just result." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686; Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77,80, 844 
P.2d 706, 709 (1992). 
It is upon this second prong that Esquivel's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
fails. The State admits that the defense attorney in this case did not advise his client of the 
client's Fifth Amendment Right to silence during the psychosexual examination. However, the 
petitioner cannot assert any prejudice as a result of that failure by defense counsel. 
Court and counsel have copies of the psychosexual evaluation previously prepared in this 
case for the original sentencing. In reviewing the psychosexual evaluation, it is clear that the 
petitioner did not cooperate with all of Dr. Engle's psychometric testing. On page 4 of his 
evaluation, Dr. Engle states that the "Esquivel declined to complete any of the items on the 
Multiphasic Sex Inventory for reasons detained under the "notification" portion of the present 
evaluation." On the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory, Esquivel omitted to answer enough 
questions that Dr. Engle was unable to validate any of the testing (page 5). On page 6, Dr. Engle 
stated " Mr. Esquivel's reluctance to complete the psychological testing or to complete the 
psychological testing in a valid manner has caused clinically significant information to be lost." 
State's Brief in Support of Summary Dismissal (Esquivel, SPOT 0500516D) 
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While Dr. Engle clearly indicates that sexual offender treatment is needed at "face" value, Dr. 
Engle also informs the court in the psychosexual evaluation that he cannot determine if the 
Esquivel is sexually obsessed, that he continually denied committing an offense, that he was 
unwilling and uninterested in treatment (because he denied the offense). 
The evaluation, in essence, was of very little value to the Court. When compared to the 
sitting trier of fact, the judge had ability to judge the credibility of the witnesses, the State's case, 
and weigh that against Esquivel's case. The trial judge in this case had the ability to assess 
credibility and she acknowledged in her sentencing how important this actually was to her. 
Beginning on page 265 of the sentencing transcript at lines 17 - 20, the Court states: "In 
particular I've also relied very heavily on what happened in the trial itself, my own recollection 
of it, my own assessment of the credibility of the witnesses in arriving at this decision." The 
Court goes on to say that she found the child victim "quite credible" (p. 266,ll: 17). The Court 
also found "Miss Witty's testimony to very credible. I don't find that some of the other 
witnesses, for example, the defendant's wife, she may very well be credible, but what I also want 
to point out is that these kinds of crime are crimes of secrecy. It is common for people who are 
around an individual to know about the activities that may be taking place." 
The Court went further in her analysis informing all partys that she watched the CARES 
tape of the child witness and, again, she did not believe that the child was coached. (sentencing 
transcript, p. 267) 
As to the value of the psychosexual evaluation, it is clear that the court relied very little 
on the evaluation. The Court notes at page 270 of the sentencing transcript that Esquivel was 
uncooperative for the evaluation. However, her comments regarding the psychosexual 
evaluation are dwarfed by the magnitude of consideration that she considered coming fi-om the 
testimony of the case itself. While she mentions that the evaluation came back with a "moderate 
State's Brief in Support of Summary Dismissal (Esquivel, SPOT 0500516D) 
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risk," she also acknowledges that Esquivel's refusal to cooperate was because he was 
maintaining his innocence. 
Sentencing a defendant is within the discretion of the trial judge. In this case, the 
defendant faced potential life sentences on three counts of lewd conduct. Esquivel received 
considerably less than the maximum allowable by the sentencing judge. He cannot, with the 
exception of pointing at the psychosexual evaluation, articulate any real prejudice in light of the 
sentencing judge's remarks regarding credibility of witnesses. The psychosexual evaluation 
carried very little, if any value. Should the Court, however, conclude that the psychosexual 
evaluation in this case was prejudicial, it is noteworthy to point out that Esquivel could be 
resentenced to include life. 
C. Lena1 Standards Applicable To Summary Dismissal Under Idaho Code 6 19- 
4906(c) 
Idaho Code Section 19-4906(c) authorizes summary disposition of an application for 
post-conviction relief. Summary dismissal of an application pursuant to I.C. 5 19- 4906 is the 
procedural equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56. State v. LePa~ze, 138 Idaho 803, 
806,69 P.3d 1064, 1067 (Ct. App. 2003). I.C. 9 19-4906(c) provides: 
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the 
application when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any 
affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine 
issue of material fact, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to 
the requested relief. If such a genuine issue of material fact is presented, an evidentiary hearing 
must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759,763,819 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct. App. 
State's Brief in Support of Summary Dismissal (Esquivel, SPOT 05005161)) 
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1991); Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146,754 P.2d 458,459 (Ct. App. 1988); Rarnirez v. 
State, 113 Idaho 87,89, 741 P.2d 374,376 (Ct. App. 1987). 
Conversely, the "application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence 
supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal." Goodwin v. State, 138 
Idaho 269,272,61 P.3d 626,629 (Ct. App. 2002) review denied (2003); LePage, 138 Idaho at 
807,69 P.3d at 1068 (citing Roman 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901). Follinus v. State, 127 
Idaho 897, 908 P.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1995) (Follinus's claim that his attorney had been ineffective 
in failing to obtain a Franks hearing to contest the veracity of statements by the search warrant 
affiant was properly summarily dismissed where the court found that trial counsel did obtain, in 
effect, a Franks hearing at the suppression hearing); Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822, 826,702 P.2d 
860, 864 (Ct. App. 1985) (record of extradition proceedings disproved applicant's claim that he 
was denied right to counsel in those proceedings). Allegations are insufficient for the grant of 
relief when they do not justifir relief as a matter of law. Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 
P.2d 1216, 1220 (1 990); Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542,545,53 1 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975); 
Reminaton v. State, 127 Idaho 443,446-47 901 P.2d 1344, 1347-48 (Ct. App. 1995); Dunlap v. 
State, 126 Idaho 901, 906, 894 P.2d 134, 139 (Ct. App. 1995) (police affidavit was sufficient to 
support issuance of search warrant, and defense attorney therefore was not deficient in failing to 
move to suppress evidence on the ground that warrant was illegally issued). 
Bare or conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any fact, are inadequate to entitle a 
petitioner to an evidentiary hearing. Roman, 125 Idaho at 647,873 P.2d at 901; Baruth v. 
Gardner, 1 10 Idaho 156, 159,715 P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1986); Stone, 108 Idaho at 826,702 
P.2d at 864. If a petitioner fails to present evidence establishing an essential element on which 
he bears the burden of proof, summary dismissal is appropriate. Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 
592, 861 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Ct. App. 1993). Where petitioner's affidavits are based upon hearsay 
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I rather than personal knowledge, summary disposition without an evidentiary hearing is 
1 appropriate. Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 844 P .2d 706 (1993). 
D. Standard Of Review Applied By The Appellate Court 
Summary disposition under Idaho Code § 19-4906(b) is the procedural equivalent of 
summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56. Rarnirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 89,741 P.2d 374,376 
(Ct. App. 1987). On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction application, the appellate court 
will review the entire record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists which, if 
resolved in petitioner's favor, would require that relief be granted. Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 
426,430,835 P.2d 661,665 (Ct. App. 1992). The appellate court will freely review this court's 
application of the law. Nellsch, 122 Idaho at 430, 835 P.2d at 665. 
The issues on appeal are, first, whether the petition alleges facts which, if true, would 
entitle the applicant to relief. Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 373, 825 P.2d 94,96 (Ct. App. 
1992). Second, whether those allegations are "supported by written statements from witnesses 
who are able to give testimony themselves as to facts within their knowledge, or [are] based upon 
otherwise verifiable information." Drapeau, 103 Idaho at 6 17, 65 1 P.2d at 55 1. In this case, 
Esquivel cannot provide facts that prove any prejudice on the ineffective assistance of counsel 
based solely on the psychosexual evaluation issue. The Court gave it very little, if any, real 
weight. This case was about credibility of witnesses. Esquivel denied what he was convicted 
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and he continued to deny at the psychosexual evaluation and at sentencing. 
The State respectfully requests that this second motion for relief be summarily denied. 
I u- 
Respectfully submitted this fday of February, 2008. 
)&I" 
kb M. Fisher 
~ ; ~ u t ~  Ada County Prosecutor 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day February 2008,I provided a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing to: Layne Davis Attorney at Law, 200 North 4th 
St., Ste. 302, Boise, ID 83702, by depositing in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid. / 
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GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Jean M. Fisher 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
602 West Idaho Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702-5954 
Telephone: (208) 364-2 12 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CARLOS ESQUIVEL, ) 
) id 
Petitioner, ) Case No. SPOT 05005lX@ 
VS. ) 
) MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) AMENDED PETITION FOR 
) POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
Respondent, 1 
) 
COMES NOW, Jean M. Fisher, Deputy Ada County Prosecutor, and motions this Court to 
Dismiss the Second Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief. 
The State respectfully submits that that the Petitioner's Amended Petition for Relief be dismissed. 
DATED this 12" day of February, 2008. 
GREG BOWER 
Ada County Prosecutor 
/J&an M. Fisher 
weputy Prosecuting Attorney 
MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION 
RELIEF (SPOT0500516D), Page 1 
4~ . 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this & % a y  of February, 2008,I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief to 
Layne Davis, Attorney at  Law, 200 North 4" St., Ste. 302, Boise, ID 83702, through the 
United States Mail, postage prepaid. 
MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION 
RELIEF (SPOT0500516D), Page 2 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Jean M. Fisher 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Room 3 191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: 287-7700 
Fax: 287-7709 
- 5 0 FILED - 
PM 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
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Hereby this Affidavit, I, Eric Rolfsen, swear to the following contents: 
1. I was the legal defense attorney for Carlos Esquivel in case number H0300476; 
2. I was the legal representative for Carlos Esquivel for the entirety of the criminal 
proceedings before Judge Cheri Copsey; 
3. I represented Carlos Esquivel at a jury trial for multiple counts of lewd conduct with a 
minor under sixteen pursuant to I.C. 18-1 508 and a count of sexual abuse of a child 
under sixteen pursuant to I.C. 18-1506; 
4. My client was convicted at the jury trial; 
mdavit of Eric Rolfsen(SP0T 050051@, Page 1 
5. My client was ordered to obtain a psychosexual evaluation prior to sentencing; 
6 .  1 did not tell my client that he had a fifth amendment right not to participate in 
that psychosexual evaluation; 
7. My client denied committing any of the acts he was charged and convicted of and 
maintained his innocence before the psychosexual evaluator. 
4h 
Respectfully submitted thisi2 day of February 2008. n 
Eric ~ z s e n  
lb 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this L d a y  of 
IP, . , Idaho, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /2 day of February, 2008, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to Layne Davis, Attorney at Law, 200 North 4th St., Ste. 302, Boise, ID 
83702, through the United States Mail, postage prepaid. 
Affidavit of Eric Rolfsen (SPOT0500516D), Page 3 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
1 1  THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
8 1 1  Petitioner, 
6 
7 
1 1  vs. 
CARLOS ESQUIVEL, 








17 1 I Esquivel of his constitutional right to remain silent during the S.A.N.E. evaluation. Therefore, the I 
Respondent. 
After reviewing the Amended Petition and the State's response, the Court finds no 
15 
16 
18 first prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel has been met; his representation fell below an I I I 
evidentiary hearing is necessary and, therefore, cancels the evidentiary hearing currently 
scheduled. Eric Rolfsen, Esquivel's trial attorney, testified in his affidavit that he did not advise 
19 1 1  objective standard of reasonableness. Estrada v. State, 143 Id. 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2007); 1 
20 1 1  att thews v. Slate, 136 Idaho 46,49,28 P.3d 387,390 (Ct.App. 2001); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho I 
23 1 1  orders the following briefing schedule: I 
21 
22 
758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). The remaining question, however, is whether Esquivel 
was prejudiced by the this failure. The State moved to dismiss the Petition. The Court hereby 
e&c*  







Esquivel shall file any response no later than April 1, 2008, and the State shall file any 
reply no later than April 20,2008. If the parties request oral argument, they shall notice one. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 429-1 200 
Facsimile: (208) 429-1 100 
Idaho State Bar No. 4640 
Conflict Counsel for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 




STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
1 
) Case No. SPOT-0500561D 
) 
) PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN 
1 OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 




COMES NOW, the Petitioner, by and through his attorney of record, Layne Davis, with 
the firm DAVIS & WALKER, and herby submits this brief in opposition of the State's Motion 
for Summary Dismissal in the above entitled matter. 
In light of the Trial Court's scheduling order, dated March 6,2008, which indicates that 
the Petitioner has met his burden of the first prong of ineffective assistance of counsel (that 
Petitioner's trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness) the 
remaining question for the court is in determining whether the Petitioner was prejudiced by this 
failure. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S., (1984). 
In the State's brief in Support of Summary Dismissal, the State concedes that the Trial 
Court relied on the Psychosexual Evaluation at the time of sentencing but that such reliance was 
slight and that the court's consideration of the Psychosexual Evaluation carried very little value 
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in the overall sentencing analysis conducted by the Trial Court. In the final analysis, however, 
the question is not how much, but whether, the Petitioner was prejudiced by trial counsel's 
failure to advise Petitioner of his right to remain silent during the SANE evaluation. 
The second part of the Strickland test is that the Petitioner must show his attorney's 
deficient performance prejudiced him. Prejudice is shown if there is a "reasonable probability" 
that Petitioner would have received a more favorable sentence had the Court not considered Dr. 
Engle's report. Strickland, 687-688. Prejudice in this case is clear because the psychosexual 
report was heavily relied upon by the State in recommending a lengthy prison sentence and, at 
least in some way, the District Court in determining the sentence and in denying the Rule 35 
motion. 
At sentencing, the State argued that the evaluation showed Mr. Esquivel needed to be 
punished severely. It stated: 
[H]e continues to pose a more significant risk. He went to SANE and was 
evaluated, although he was not particularly forthcoming in the SANE evaluation, 
nor cooperative. He refused to answer MSI questions because he said he just 
didn't like the questions and he thought that were just, in his words, sick or 
perverted or something along those lines. He wouldn't appropriately answer the 
Millon and so that test couldn't be scored. Unfortunately the examination doesn't 
give the evaluation - doesn't give the Court as much information as you might 
have liked, but that is the defendant's doing and he chose not to be cooperative 
with that. It is interesting to note that Dr Engle . . . immediately detects that [Mr. 
Esquivel] has an attitude of arrogance and an attitude that conveys clearly that he 
is a victim of the instant offense, the criminal justice system, and the evaluation 
process and that's reflected in Dr. Engle's evaluation of the defendant. 
So looking at the risk, Judge, I think when Dr. Engle says he's at least a medium 
risk to reoffend, that's in the best light given that the defendant doesn't finish out 
on testing in this case. He's in total denial of what happened. . . . 
Given all that, Your Honor, the State in evaluating this case knows that this is a 
situation that calls out for a prison sentence. There are issues which involve 
punishment and retribution. There are concerns that the defendant is not a 
rehabilitation candidate at this time because he is in total denial[.] 
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T (30424) pg. 256, In. 21 - pg. 258, In. 18. 
The Court imposed the precise sentence recommended by the state and in doing so relied 
upon Dr. Engle's report. 
So when I look at all these facts and I look at the fact that Mr. Esquivel was really 
not cooperative in that evaluation and I realize that there's an argument to be 
made that a person does this if they are innocent of the charge, but I was 
concerned when I saw that he didn't complete the part of the test and I don't buy 
the whole idea that he was uncomfortable with answering questions about his own 
sexual interests. He was aware that this was an important evaluation that the 
Court was going to take into consideration in deciding what to do. I'm concerned 
again with the guarded nature in which he answered some of the questions by the 
evaluator. True it is that - it's not to be unexpected that an individual will get an 
evaluation of a moderate level of risk because of denial, but the fact of the matter 
is that the Court cannot ignore the fact that he was evaluated as having a moderate 
level of risk. Although today he's indicated that he's interested in having and 
attending the appropriate therapy, I want to note that it's easy to come into this 
Court and make those kinds of assertions, but all along in his comments to the 
evaluator he made it clear that he was not interested in having any sort of 
treatment. 
T (30424) pg. 270, In. 2-22. 
Along these same lines, the Court relied upon Dr. Engle's evaluation in denying Mr. 
Esquivel's Rule 35 motion. It wrote: 
The S.A.N.E. evaluation stated Esquivel was at moderate risk to re-offend and the 
evaluator opined he was not amenable to treatment because in part he denied an 
offense occurred and was uninterested and unwilling to participate in sex offender 
treatment. 
CR (30424) 12 1 ; Memorandum Decision (denying Rule 35 Motion), pg. 4. 
In light of the sentencing court's reliance upon Dr. Engle's report, it is clear that Mr. 
Esquivel was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to obtain an independent psychosexual 
evaluation or at least suppress the court-ordered one. The analysis of the reliance on the 
psychosexual evaluation by the sentencing court should not be a quantitative one. In other words, 
the question of prejudice is not resolved by the suggestion that the evaluation was not relied on 
heavily by the court or that there are other factors in sentencing which would have led to the 
same result. Given the state's sentencing argument, the court's reference to the evaluation in its 
sentencing, and the given the court's imposition of the state's recommendation makes it clear 
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that the Petitioner was prejudiced by his trial counsel's ineffective assistance of counsel. The 
Petitioner is entitled to be sentenced without such prejudice. 
For the reasons above, this Court should conclude that the Petitioner was prejudiced by 
his trial counsel's failure to advise him of his Fifth Amendment privilege with regard to the 
psychosexual evaluation, and should order a resentencing before a different judge. 
Oral argument 
DATED this day of April, 2008. 
DAVIS & WALKER 
BY 
Layne Davis 
Conflict Counsel for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of April, 2008, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney [ 1 U.S. MAIL 
200 W. Front St., Ste. 3191 )w: HAND DELIVERED 
Boise, ID 83702 [ 1 FACSIMILE 
[ 1 OVERNIGHT MAIL 
DAVIS & WALKER 
Layne Davis 
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DAVIS & WALKER 
200 North 4th Street, Suite 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 429- 1200 
Facsimile: (208) 429- 1 100 
Idaho State Bar No. 4640 
Conflict Counsel for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CARLOS ESQUIVEL, 1 
) Case No. SPOT0500561 
Petitioner, ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS 
VS. BENJAMIN IN SUPPORT OF 
SECOND AMENDED PETITION 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, AND AFFIDAVIT FOR POST 
1 CONVICTION RELIEF 
Respondent. 1 
Dennis Benjamin, being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby deposes and says: 
1. I am over eighteen years of age and am competent to testify about the matters herein. 
2. I was appointed counsel for the petitioner on appeal and am familiar with the files and 
record in his criminal and post-conviction cases. 
3. Based on my experience, observations and conversations with other attorneys who 
handle post-conviction cases, I believe that the general practice in cases where there 
has been a resentencing ordered pursuant to Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 
833 (2006), rehearing denied (2007), certiorari denied Idaho v. Estrudu, 128 S.Ct. 5 1 
(2007) is to assign a new sentencing judge who has not been exposed to either the 
improperly obtained evaluation or the presentence report. 
4. In particular, I am currently the attorney of record in two criminal cases which are set 
for resentencing due to successful post-conviction proceedings. In both cases the 
District Court granted the post-conviction petition finding ineffective assistance of 
counsel under Estrada v. State. 
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5. In both cases, the post-conviction court sealed the psychosexual evaluation and the 
Presentence Investigation Report and the sentencing was set before a District Judge 
who had not read either of the sealed documents. 
6. In the first case, State v. Estrada, Twin Falls Co. No. CR-2001-0544, the original 
sentencing judge was the Honorable Nathan Higer and the post-conviction petition 
was heard by the Honorable G. Richard Bevan. Upon remand from the Idaho 
Supreme Court, Judge Bevan sealed the psychosexual evaluation and the presentence 
report and assigned the case to the Honorable Randy J. Stoker for resentencing. 
7. In the other case, State v. Herrera, Bannock Co. No. CR-2003-19657-FE, the 
Honorable Ronald E. Bush was the original sentencing judge. However, the 
resentencing was assigned to the Honorable David C. Nye by Administrative Judge 
Peter McDermott. 
8. In my opinion, it is in the best interests of judicial economy and fairness to have a 
new sentencing judge assigned because it is difficult, if not impossible, for the 
original sentencing court to put aside the material which has been obtained in 
violation of Estrada and which has been or should be sealed. A reasonable person 
might conclude that any sentence imposed by such a court has been affected, whether 
consciously or unconsciously, by the improperly obtained material. Again, in my 
opinion, because this common sense conclusion, whether true or false in any 
particular case, undermines the public's confidence in the integrity and impartiality of 
the courts, the policy of assigning a new sentencing judge in such cases is wise and 
fulfils the goals of Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2A. 
This ends my affidavit. 
Dennis Benj amin 
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and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
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Ada County Prosecutor 
200 W. Front St., Rm. 3191 
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a r d U E i i L .  
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Jean M. Fisher 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3 191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: 287-7700 
Fax: 287-7709 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
State of Idaho, ) 
) 
Respondent, 1 Case No. SPOT 0500561D 
VS. ) 
) Supplemental Brief in Response 
CARLOS ESQUIVEL, ) to Petitioner's Opposition to 
) State's Motion to Dismiss 
Petitioner. ) 
) 
COMES NOW, Jean M. Fisher, Deputy Ada County Prosecutor, and files this 
supplemental brief in response to the opposition brief filed in this matter. The State herein 
incorporates all other State briefs and filings within this supplemental response as well. In the 
petitioner's brief, he suggests that there is a bright line analysis when determining if there was 
any error at all by the sentencing judge and if there is, then he suggests that a bright line rule 
STATE'S SUPPLEMENI'AL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
(Esquivel v. State of Idaho, SPOT0500651), Page 1 
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articulating that the judge should be disqualified from the case and a new judge should be 
appointed for re-sentencing. This is NOT the law. 
Strickland requires that the petitioner must show with particularity how his 
attorney's deficient performance prejudiced him. It is not enough to merely allege prejudice 
without providing an adequate showing. Thus, the first element - deficient performance - 
"requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." @. at 687,104 S. Ct. at 2064,80 
L. Ed. 2d at 693. The second element - prejudice - requires a showing that counsel's deficient 
performance actually had an adverse effect on his defense; i.e., but for counsel's deficient 
performance, there was a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been 
different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693; Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241,244 
(Ct. App. 1999). Regarding the second element, Esquivel has the burden of showing that his trial 
counsels' deficient conduct "so undermined the proper hctioning of the adversarial process that 
the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686; 
v. State, 123 Idaho 77,80,844 P.2d 706,709 (1992). 
As explained in Ivev v. State, 123 Idaho 77,80,844 P.2d 706,709 (1992), "The 
constitutional requirement for effective assistance of counsel is not the key to the prison for a 
defendant who can dredge up a long series of examples of how the case might have been tried 
better." 
In this case, Esquivel cannot satis@ the second prong of the Strickland test. Idaho has 
long stood for the proposition that its sentencing judges are granted discretion in sentencing. In 
State v. Pierce, 100 Idaho 57, 58,593 P.12d 392 (1979); State v. Campbell, 123 Idaho 922,926, 
854 P.2d 265 (Ct.App. 1993), Courts have presumed that a sentencing court is able to ascertain 
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the relevancy and reliability of the broad range of information and material which was presented 
to it during the sentencing process, to disregard the irrelevant and unreliable evidence, and to 
properly weigh the remaining evidence which may be in conflict. 
In this case, the district court judge heard all of the evidence presented to the jury in this 
case. Additionally, she was able to review evidence that the jury did not see - the CARES 
interview of the young child. As the sitting judge, she was able to see the case unfold and to 
evaluate the State's case and compare it against the defendant's case. The judge is in a position 
to also determine and assess credibility. In this case, she heard from the child, the child's family, 
law enforcement and its investigation. She also heard the defendant's side of the case. She also 
already knew that the defendant denied ever committing these offenses and acknowledged so at 
the time of sentencing. 
At the time of sentencing however the defendant no longer stands before the court with a 
presumption of innocence cloaking him. He was found guilty by a jury. The judge did order the 
defendant to participate in a psychosexual evaluation. However, the defendant was not 
particularly cooperative and much of the value of the evaluation was lost. At sentencing, on 
pages 265 through 270, the Court lists all of the factors that she considered at the time of 
sentencing. In particular she spoke of 1. the CARES tape; 2. the consistency and manner in 
which Angie was able to testify about where and how the assaults took place; 3. she specifically 
rejected the defendant's theory that Angie was "coached"; 4. the judge saw and believed that 
Angie was scared and will be affected by the abuse for years to come; 5. the court recognized that 
he was guarded in the evaluation but rejected his reasoning for being guarded (that he was "not 
comfortable with the sexual nature of the questions"); 6. the court recognized that the defendant 
STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL BIUEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
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himself said he was not interested in any treatment despite the jury's opinion; 7. his substance 
abuse history. 
Looking at all of that, it is clear that this court considered far more factors than merely the 
psychosexual evaluation. The district court judge did "ascertain the relevancy and reliability of 
I 
the broad range of information and material which was presented to it during the sentencing 
process, to disregard the irrelevant anh unreliable evidence, and to properly weigh the remaining 
evidence which may be in conflict." State v. Pierce, 100 Idaho 57,58,593 P.2d 392 (1979). 
C. Legal Standards Applicable To Summarv Dismissal Under Idaho Code 4 19-4906(c) 
Idaho Code Section 19-4906(c) authorizes summary disposition of an application for 
post-conviction relief. Summary dismissal of an application pursuant to LC. $ 19- 4906 is the 
procedural equivalent of surnrnary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56. State v. LePage, 13 8 Idaho 803, 
806,69 P.3d 1064, 1067 (Ct. App. 2003). LC. $ 19-4906(c) provides: 
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the 
application when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any 
affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine 
issue of material fact, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to 
the requested relief. If such a genuine issue of material fact is presented, an evidentiary hearing 
must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763,s 19 P.2d 1 159, 1163 (Ct. App. 
1991); Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146,754 P.2d 458,459 (Ct. App. 1988); Ramirez v. 
State, 113 Idaho 87,89,741 P.2d 374,376 (Ct. App. 1987). -
Conversely, the "application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence 
supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal." Goodwin v. State, 138 
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Idaho 269,272,61 P.3d 626,629 (Ct. App. 2002) review denied (2003); LePane, 138 Idaho at 
807,69 P.3d at 1068 (citing Roman 125 Idaho at 647,873 P.2d at 901). Follinus v. State, 127 
Idaho 897,908 P.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1995) (Follinus's claim that his attorney had been ineffective 
in failing to obtain a Franlcs hearing to contest the veracity of statements by the search warrant 
affiant was properly summarily dismissed where the court found that trial counsel did obtain, in 
effect, a Franks hearing at the suppression hearing); Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822, 826,702 P.2d 
860,864 (Ct. App. 1985) (record of extradition proceedings disproved applicant's claim that he 
was denied right to counsel in those proceedings). Allegations are insufficient for the grant of 
relief when they do not justiQ relief as a matter of law. Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 
P.2d 12 16, 1220 (1990); Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542,545,53 1 P.2d 1 187, 1 190 (1975); 
Remington v. State, 127 Idaho 443,446-47 901 P.2d 1344, 1347-48 (Ct. App. 1995); Dunlap v. 
State 126 Idaho 901,906,894 P.2d 134, 139 (Ct. App. 1995) (police affidavit was sufficient to -3 
support issuance of search warrant, and defense attorney therefore was not deficient in failing to 
move to suppress evidence on the ground that warrant was illegally issued). 
Bare or conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any fact, are inadequate to entitle a 
petitioner to an evidentiary hearing. Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901; Baruth v. 
Gardner, 110 Idaho 156,159,715 P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1986); Stone, 108 Idaho at 826,702 
P.2d at 864. If a petitioner fails to present evidence establishing an essential element on which 
he bears the burden of proof, summary dismissal is appropriate. Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 
592,861 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Ct. App. 1993). Where petitioner's affidavits are based upon hearsay 
rather than personal knowledge, summary disposition without an evidentiary hearing is 
appropriate. Ivev v. State, 123 Idaho 77,844 P .2d 706 (1993). 
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The State respecthlly requests that this claim be dismissed. In the alternative, if the 
claim is not dismissed, the State respectfully requests that this court deny the relief sought in 
obtaining a new judge for sentencing. To grant such relief would seriously jeopardize the State. 
This is a case that went to jury trial where this court had the advantage of determining credibility 
of a young child. This court also had a number of other family members to compare and contrast 
the testimony of the child in determining the credibility. 
Under the court decisions previously articulated [State v. Pierce, State v. Campbell, State 
v. Bundy, State v. Holmes), the Court in its discretion is presumed to have the ability to sort 
through relevant and unreliable evidence. Thls court did so in this case. 
Dated this 3rd day of June, 2008. 
I I  - 
J&#I P\ Fisher 
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II IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF I 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CARLOS ESQUIVEL, I 
ORDER CONDITIONALLY 
DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED 
THE STATE OF IDAHO PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF 
1 1  Petitioner, 
This Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is before the Court after the Court of Appeals in 
Case No. SPOT 0500561 
an unpublished decision affirmed the Court, in part, and, reversed it in part, and remanded the case 
l2 ( 1  for huther proceedings consistent with the Court of Appeals' ruling. I 
l3 1 1  Upon remand, the Court appointed counsel on September 4, 2007, and held a status 
l4 1 1  conference on November 29, 2007. On January 31, 2008, Esquivel filed a Second Amended I 
l5 1 1  Petition alleging ineffective counsel in Case No. H0300476, based on his claim his counsel failed I 1 1  to advise him of h s  Fifth Amendment right to remain silent during his psychosexual evaluation. 
1 6  I 
I I Esquivel supported his Second Amended Petition with an affidavit from his trial counsel in which I 
hls trial counsel testified that he did not advise Esquivel of his Fifth Amendment right to remain 
silent. Esquivel also indicated no evidentiary hearing was necessary. 
l9 1 1  The State moved to summarily dismiss Esquivel's Second Amended Petition on February I 
20 1 1  13, 2008, and the Court heard oral argument on June 4, 2008, and took the matter under I 
advisement on June 1 1,2008. 
Having reviewed the Second Amended Petition and any evidence in a light most favorable 
to Esquivel, the Court finds that it is satisfied that Esquivel is not entitled to post-conviction relief. 
LC. 819-4906(2). The Court further finds there is no dispute of material fact and no purpose 
would be served by any further proceedings. Therefore, by this order, the Court is indicating its 
intention to dismiss Esquivel's Petition. 
2 6 
r 
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I I Esquivel and the State may reply to the Court's notice of the proposed dismissal within 20 
days.' In light of his reply, if any, or any failure to reply, the Court may order the Second 
Amended Petition dismissed, grant leave to file an amended application or, direct that the 
I I proceedings otherwise continue. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The State charged Esquivel with three counts of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Under 
Sixteen, Felony, I.C. 5 18-1 508 and one count of Sexual Abuse of a Minor, Felony, I.C. tj 18-1 506. 
At trial, the young victim testified that the sexual abuse began when she was eight years 
old and involved genital to genital contact, both vaginal and anal. She testified that it continued 
1 1  until she was ten years old when she began to avoid seeing him. Esquivel was her cousin's 
1 1  step-father. Once the abuse began, it continued and was repeated. The victim described her 
beddings as being wet after he would finish abusing her. She described in detail an attack that 
occurred in Esquivel's bedroom and described the lubricant next to the bed. 
11 To avoid the continued sexual abuse, she stopped visiting her cousin who was her best I I fiiend. The child was traumatized and will never be the same. Esquivel's actions violated her trust 
and tore the entire family apart. Now sisters do not speak to one another. The child testified that 
she did not tell anyone until she became convinced Esquivel would begin abusing her cousin, his 
step-daughter. 
At trial, the State attempted to introduce the CARES tape of the interview with the child 
I I victim. At counsel's request, the Court viewed the tape and denied the State's request. The tape 
I I demonstrated the consistencies in the child's testimony. 
Esquivel testified at trial after being advised on the record of his Fifth Amendment right to 
remain silent and further advised that anything he said could be used against him. More 
specifically, the Court advised him as follows: 
THE COURT: Now, you've indicated the defendant is going to testify. I 
want to make sure - I would like to inquire directly of the defendant. I need to 
make sure that you understand that you do have the right not to testify, but you also 
I "Where the state has filed a motion for summary disposition, but the court dismisses the application on grounds 
different fiom those asserted in the state's motion, it does so on its own initiative and the court must provide twenty 
days notice." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, -, 164 P.3d 798, 804 (2007) (citing Saykhamchone v. State, 127 
Idaho 3 19,322,900 P.2d 795,798 (1995)). 
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have the right to testify under our constitution and it is not for your attorney to 
decide whether you testify. You need to understand that anything you say on the 
stand can be used against you. So I need to inform you it is your decision to make 
it and it - I'm going to ask you at this time is it your decision to testify today? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is. 
Esquivel testified that he had not committed any of the acts testified to by the child. He 
unequivocally denied responsibility for the crime. 
The jury found Esquivel guilty on all counts. The Court ordered a pre-sentence report and 
I ( ordered a psychosexual evaluation. Esquivel's trial counsel testified on post-conviction that he did I 
7 
11 
Ilwhich were reported in the psychosexual evaluation were consistent with those made at trial. He I 




1 1  did not complete a number of the tests causing the examiner to note that clinically significant I 
1 2  
Esquivel made no incriminating statements to the psychosexual evaluator and, in fact, he 
continued to deny responsibility, just as he had at trial. The statements he made to the examiner 
1 1  information had been lost. The examiner also noted that Esquivel's continuing denial and lack of I 
As Esquivel's trial attorney correctly noted at sentencing, when a defendant who has been I 
13  
l4  
11 found guilty of a sex offense continues to maintain innocence, the psychosexual examiner will I 
interest in sex offender treatment made him unacceptable for out-patient treatment. Based on these 
factors, the examiner opined that Esquivel was at a moderate risk to re-offend. 
11 always conclude that the offender is at moderate risk to reoffend because he is not amenable to 
1 7  I 
I I treatment. I 
l8 11 At the outset of the Court's pronouncement of sentence, the Court stated as follows: 
In particular, I've also relied very heavily on what happened in the trial 
itself, my own recollection of it, my own assessment of the credibility of the ~ 
I 
witnesses in arriving at this decision. . . . 
I want to make it clear that I sat through this trial. I also observed the 
CARES tape at the request of both counsel because there was a request to have the 
CARES tape introduced at some point in the trial which I denied, and what I found 
is that - I would make a specific finding that I found the child victim in this case 
quite credible. 
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11 The Court continued for some time detailing the testimony it heard and why that testimony 
1 1 I suggested the child's testimony was credible and Esquivel's was not. See Transcript pp. 266-269. 
* 11 For example, the Court stated as follows: 
There were a couple of things that I found interesting. I know that the Defendant 
claims in this case the child in his view was coached, but in listening to her 
testimony both here in court and on the CARES tape, there were a couple of things 
that struck me. First, I noticed - that there was consistency, but it wasn't 
consistency like you see with someone who was coached. In my private practice I 
observed children who have been coached and one of the things that I noticed was 
that they repeat the exact same words over and over again. And, furthermore, the 
other things that I have noticed with children who have been coached is generally 
they are coached to use a much more sophisticated set of words than I saw that 
Angie used. The words she used were the words of a young child and in many ways 
a child, even though she was older at the time she was testifying, they were the 
words of a child who is fairly - clear to the Court fairly unsophisticated. What I 
found particularly important is, as the prosecutor pointed out, she credibly 
described ejaculate. She described it as a wet bed. Now, if she were being coached, 
she would have described it differently and I think it is something that the jury 
picked up on. It's certainly something that I picked up on in listening to her. She 
I did not seem to know what it was, but she described pretty accurately what it would 
I be like if there was ejaculate on the bed. 
l5 11 lubricant Esquivel used and where it was in his bedroom. The Court observed: 
1 4  
Furthermore, I noticed that while the majority of the times that she said that 
she was sexually assaulted occurred in the one bedroom, there was one incident 
which she described in the master bedroom. I found that rather significant because 
the description in that case was significantly different. She was able to describe 
where the lubricant was kept, something a child normally would not even know 
about in going into a room unless she's seen someone take it down and use it in a 
specific way. Children, and, quite frankly, even I as an adult am not observant 
enough to notice when someone has lubricant in their bedroom, but she was able to 
describe that and describe how it was used. 
The Court carefully observed how consistent the child's testimony was, finding no evidence to 
suggest she had been coached. In particular, the Court noted that the child was able to describe the 
The Court also found that the child's difficulty in describing anatomical parts was consistent with 
22 11 her age and suggested she had not been coached, contrary to Esquive17s claims. 
When I looked at all those things, I came to the conclusion that contrary to 
what the Defendant says, this is not a child who's -who has been coached. This 
was a child who was, I think, credibly testifying to what she observed and as I 
indicated, she didn't really waiver too much in what she was describing and she had 
difficulty in describing the anatomical parts which I found to be interesting, too. 
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7 I1 The Court observed the real fear that the child victim experienced and noted that her 1 1  manner of disclosure was consistent with the typical way in which these kinds of crimes are 
11 discovered. The Court stated as follows: 
I thought, again, her testimony was quite - was quite understandable and when I 
looked at the CARES tape, it was interesting, again, that she testified there that she 
was very - she was fearful for Marissa [her cousin] and that in part this is what 
caused her to come forward. I also found that the way in which the report came 
out, a spontaneous report at a friend's house with a person with whom she felt 
comfortable, is a fairly typical way things like this would come out and she made it 
clear it was not something she wanted to do, she didn't plan it, and she didn't report 
to her adoptive mother, instead she reported to a friend, and a friend, like I said, that 
she felt comfortable with. She was obviously uncomfortable discussing it with her 
adoptive mother and I think in listening to her, that she. was - it seemed to me 
anyway that she was concerned about the impact because she's not stupid, she's a 
very bright young person, the impact this potentially was going to have on her 
family. 
l1 II The Court also discussed the impact this crime would have on the victim and on her ( 1  family. 
In looking at what she has written and what she testified to, it is clear that 
she is still scared. This has impacted her in ways that will come out and unfold 
over the years. She has been changed forever. Hopefully she will survive this and 
become a stronger person. But let's make no bones about it, this is a young girl 
whose life has been changed forever and I would suggest that this entire family's 
life has been changed forever. It was an extreme violation of the child's trust and 
it's the result of a series and continual bad choices that I believe were made on the 
part of the Defendant. 
The Court also noted that while Esquivel's lack of cooperation with the psychosexual 
l8 11 examiner could be consistent with someone who was innocent of the charges, his continued denial 
l9 I1 made treatment and rehabilitation problematic. The Court stated: "I will also note that I did take 
20 1 1  into account that his lack of amenability to treatment and also his clear use of illegal substances" I I including heroin. 
2 1 
I I Given all of this, this Court imposed a thirty (30) year aggregate sentence with fifteen (15) 
22  1 I year(s) fixed and fifteen (15) year(s) indeterminate on each of the three counts of Lewd Conduct 
23 11 with a Minor Under Sixteen. On the Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen, the Court 
2 4  1 1  imposed fifteen (1 5) years aggregate with five (5) years fixed and ten (10) years indeterminate. All 
25 II sentences were to run concurrently. 
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Esquivel moved the Court to reconsider, and the Court denied his Motion. Esquivel 
appealed and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the jury's verdict and the Court's sentence in an 
unpublished opinion. 
On July 15, 2005, Esquivel, filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief, claiming ineffective 
trial counsel based on several allegations. On December 12, 2005, after numerous motions, the 
Court dismissed his Amended Petition and Esquivel appealed. On August 3, 2007, in an 
unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals affirrned the Court, in part, and, reversed it in part, 
post-conviction claim that his counsel was ineffective in failing to arrange an independent 
psychosexual evaluation or otherwise mitigate the effects of the court-ordered evaluation." 
The Court appointed counsel to pursue the only remaining claim, ". . . that his counsel was 
7 
l1 II ineffective in failing to arrange an independent psychosexual evaluation or otherwise mitigate the 
remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with the Court of Appeals' ruling. The Court 
of Appeals instructed this Court to appoint counsel to "assist Esquivel in pursuing the 
l3 11 for failing to question the conduct of the exam or to request a different expert to conduct an 
1 2  
l4  11 independent examination, he now asserts for the first time that his counsel was ineffective because 
effects of the court-ordered evaluation," as provided by the Court of Appeals decision. Esquivel 
filed a Second Amended Petition and on remand, in addition to claiming his counsel ineffective 
15 ( 1  he failed to advise Petitioner that he could simply chosen not to participate at all in the evaluation. 
16 1 1  Esquivel abandoned his claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to question the 
l7 1 1  conduct of the psychosexual evaluation or to request a different expert to conduct an independent 
examination, because he presented no argument or evidence regarding these claims to the Court. 
ANALYSIS 
A petition for Post Conviction Relief can be filed at any time within one year from the 
expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following appeal, 
which ever is later. I.C. 919-4902. In this case, Esquivel was sentenced on January 13,2004. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed his sentence on December 3, 2004, and filed the Remittitur March 2, 
2005. Esquivel timely filed his post-conviction Petition on July 13,2005. 
2 4 
Esquivel appealed the Court's decision dismissing his Amended Petition and on August 3, 
2007, in an unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Court, in part, and, reversed it 
2 6 
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Esquivel's application, in essence, claims his trial counsel was deficient for failing 
to either question the conduct of the expert who performed the evaluation or request 
a different expert conduct a new psychosexual evaluation. . . . 
1 
While we offer no opinion on the appropriateness of his trial counsel's conduct, the 
facts alleged by Esquivel, combined with the record, raises the possibility of a valid 
claim as to counsel's inaction regarding the psychosexual evaluation. . . . on 
remand, we instruct the district court to appoint counsel to assist Esquivel in 
pursuing the post-conviction claim that his counsel was ineffective in failing to 
arrange an independent psychosexual evaluation or otherwise mitigate the effects of 
the court-ordered evaluation. 
in part, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with the Court of Appeals' ruling. In 
particular, the Court of Appeals ruled as follows: 
1 I (Emphasis in the opinion.) 
11 Esquivel filed a Second Amended Petition and on remand, in addition to claiming his 
lo 11 counsel ineffective for failing to question the conduct of the exam or to request a different expert 
to conduct an independent examination, he now asserts for the first time that his counsel was 
ineffective because he failed 
. . . to advise Petitioner he have could simply chosen not to participate at all in the 
evaluation. 
The evaluation by Dr. Engle, among other things, indicates the Petitioner to 
not be a candidate for outpatient sex offender treatment, in part because of the 
Petitioner's denial during the examination, that he had sexually abused the alleged 
victim in the substantive case. 
Esquivel relied on Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 563, 149 P.3d 833, 838 (2006), decided after 
this Court's decision dismissing his Amended Petition. Esquivel supported his Second Amended 
l8 11 Petition with an affidavit from his trial counsel in which his trial counsel testified that he did not 
l9  11 advise Esquivel of his Fifih Amendment right to remain silent during the psychosexual evaluation. 
20 ( 1  Esquivel also indicated no evidentiary hearing was necessary 
2008. The Court heard oral argument on June 4,2008, and took the matter under advisement. 
An application for post-conviction relief is in the nature of a civil proceeding, entirely 
distinct from the underlying criminal proceeding. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 798, 25 P.3d 
2 1 
2 2 
The State moved to summarily dismiss Esquivel's Second Amended Petition on February 
13, 2008, and filed additional argument on June 4, 2008. Esquivel filed argument on April 7, 
2 5  
2 6 
1 10, 1 11 (2001). An application for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary 
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civil action, however, because an application must contain much more than "a short and plain 
statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). Hernandez v. 
State, 133 Idaho 794, 797,992 P.2d 789, 792 (Ct.App. 1999). The application must present or be 
accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject 
to dismissal. Id. Finally, a petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which his claims are based. I.C.R. 5 7 ( ~ ) . ~  
In this case, Esquivel's claim is ineffective counsel. Esquivel does not claim the sentence 
imposed was illegal or that there were any grounds to suppress evidence. 
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Standard. 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an applicant for post-conviction 
relief must demonstrate (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result 
would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Estrada v. 
State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006). 
First, to establish a deficiency, Esquivel has the burden of showing that his attorney's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Matthews v. State, 136 Idaho 
46, 49, 28 P.3d 387, 390 (Ct.App. 2001); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 
1176 (1988). As the Estrada court held, an attorney's performance falls below the objective 
standard of reasonableness and is, thus, deficient if he or she fails to inform his client of the right 
to remain silent or right to not participate in a court ordered psychosexual evaluation. Estrada, 143 
Idaho at 564, 149 P.3d at 839. Esquivel's attorney testified he did not inform Esquivel of his right 
to remain silent during the psychosexual evaluation. Thus, Esquivel has proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence that his attorney's advice, or lack of advice, was deficient. That 
does not end the inquiry. The Estrada court did not change the requirement that Esquivel prove he 
was prejudiced by the deficient advice. 
Second, in order to succeed on post-conviction, Esquivel must show, bv a preponderance 
of the evidence, that he was prejudiced by his attorney's deficiency or that the sentence would 
have been different. Strickland, 466 U. S. at 69 1 -92; Ramirez v. State, 1 19 Idaho 1037, 104 1, 8 1 2 
2 I.C.R. 57(c). Burden of Proof. The petitioner shall have the burden of proving the petitioner's grounds for relief by a 
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P.2d 751, 755 (Ct.App. 1991). "To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable 
probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have 
been different." GiZpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 81, 57 P.3d 787, 792 (2002) (quoting 
Jakoski v. State, 136 Idaho 280, 282, 32 P.3d 672, 674 (Ct.App.2001)). In order to properly 
consider his claim, the Court must analyze Estrada and compare the facts in Estrada to those here. 
B. Esquivel cannot show the requisite prejudice. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Estrada recognized that prior to sentencing, the fifth 
amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the sixth amendment right to counsel apply to 
psychosexual evaluations ordered by the court to be conducted prior to sentencing. Estrada, 143 
Idaho at 563-64, 149 P.3d at 838-89. An attorney's performance falls below the objective standard 
of reasonableness and is, thus, deficient if he or she fails to inform the client of the right to remain 
silent or right to not participate in a court ordered psychosexual evaluation. Estrada, 143 Idaho at 
564, 149 P.3d at 839. 
However, the Supreme Court did not change the rule that once a defendant proves the 
attorney failed to properly advise the defendant, the defendant must still prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 565, 149 P.3d at 840 (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 694). "[Rleasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome." Id. 
The facts in Estrada are important. In Estrada, unlike this case, the defendant pled guilty, 
thus admitting responsibility. Esquivel, on the other hand, was found guilty after a jury trial in 
which he testified repeatedly that he was innocent after being properly advised of his right to 
remain silent. 
Moreover, Estrada was initially uncooperative in the psychosexual evaluation and, in fact, 
he wrote to the district court, asserting that the evaluation was unnecessary and caused a frustrating 
delay in his sentencing. Estrada's attorney responded by writing a letter to Estrada advising him 
that the evaluation was not a delay tactic, but "must be completed before sentencing." The attorney 
preponderance of the evidence. 
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also commented, "I want every single good piece of evidence that I can get my hands on to be able 
to argue at your sentencing." Based on the letter, Estrada decided to participate in the evaluation. 
Later, however, Estrada again became uncooperative and failed to complete certain 
evaluation forms, which prompted the evaluator to contact Estrada's attorney to relay Estrada's 
refusal to cooperate. The attorney sent Estrada another letter, in which he noted that the evaluation 
was ordered by the district court. The attorney wrote, "We would not want the judge to consider 
your lack of cooperation to mean that you are not willing to comply with court orders." 
Thereafter, Estrada participated in the evaluation, which took place in the county jail. The 
evaluation was filed with the district court and included a number of unfavorable and derogatory 
comments about Estrada, including references to his potential for future violent actions. 
Unlike Estrada, Esquivel never cooperated in his psychosexual evaluation. He refused to 
complete psychometric testing making the evaluator conclude that "clinically significant 
information had been lost." He maintained his innocence throughout the testing, made no 
incriminating statements and, in fact, the reported statements in the evaluation are consistent with 
those he made at trial. 
While in Estrada the sentencing judge3 made specific, repeated references to the 
psychosexual evaluation and its finding that Estrada was a violent person and clearly relied on it in 
arriving at the sentence, that did not happen in this case. In this case, the only reason this Court 
discussed the psychosexual evaluation at all was because the Court had ordered the evaluation. 
This Court, at sentencing, only noted several times that Esquivel continued to maintain his 
innocence during the psychosexual evaluation causing the evaluator to conclude that he was not 
amenable to treatment placing him at moderate risk to reoffend. However, the Court already knew 
he was not amenable to rehabilitation, because he denied culpability at trial. The psychosexual 
evaluation itself added no new information to what this Court already knew based on Esquivel's 
testimony at trial. In fact, his lack of participation in the psychosexual evaluation was predictable 
3 The judge who decided the post-conviction petition in Estrada was a different judge. Therefore, any findings by the 
post-conviction judge were not based on personal knowledge, unlike in this case. 
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given his trial testimony.4 In view of Esquivel's testimony, there is nothing in the psychosexual 
evaluation that could have affected the Court's sentence. 
While the Court of Appeals suggests in its decision that the mention5 of the psychosexual 
evaluation implied that the Court relied on the report, that is not the case. This Court determined 
Esquivel's sentence based on the testimony he gave and the evidence produced at trial and not on 
the psychosexual evaluation. The psychosexual evaluation did not increase or reduce his sentence. 
Esquivel did not receive a different sentence, either enhanced reduced, based on his refusal to 
cooperate in the psychosexual evaluation or because of its contents. It was his failure to accept 
responsibility that demonstrated rehabilitation was unlikely. 
It is well established that Idaho trial courts may consider a defendant's failure to accept 
responsibility in determining whether rehabilitation efforts would be fruitful when imposing 
sentence. See State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 494, 988 P.2d 715, 720 (Ct.App.1999); State v. 
Brown, 131 Idaho 61, 73, 951 P.2d 1288, 1300 (Ct.App.1998); State v. Wheeler, 129 Idaho 735, 
l3 1 1  P.2d 945, 947 (Ct.App.1988). A trial court may consider the failure to take responsibility for 
1 2  
l 4  11 crimes committed in considering the defendant's potential for rehabilitation. See Murphy, 133 
932 P.2d 363 (Ct.App. 1997); State v. Smith, 127 Idaho 632, 903 P.2d 1329 (Ct.App. 1995); State 
v. Fertig, 126 Idaho 364, 883 P.2d 722 (Ct.App.1994); State v. Nooner, 114 Idaho 654, 656, 759 
1 5  I I Idaho at 494,988 P.2d at 720. 
l6 I1 In reviewing the record, it is clear that this Court's references to the psychosexual 
l7 11 evaluation were limited to its conclusion regarding his amenability to treatment and rehabilitation, 
1 1  in sentencing and in considering his lack of amenability to treatment was caused by any violation 
18 
11 of his fifth amendment rights; he cannot prove prejudice, the second prong of Strickland. 
a matter long held to be appropriate to sentencing, and a conclusion clearly predicted by his own 
testimony at trial. Therefore, Esquivel cannot establish that this Court's exercise of its discretion 
4 Following this trial, the Court no longer orders psychosexual evaluations where the defendant testifies that he is 
innocent, because the result is predictable, just as Esquivel's attorney opined at Esquivel's sentencing. 
5 At sentencing trial courts frequently identify those things the court has read or reviewed. That does not mean, 
however, those items were factors in the sentence. For example, the trial court may read and consider the numerous 
letters received in support of a defendant or letters from victims but that does not mean those letters have great impact 
on the sentence. 
ORDER CONDITIONALLY DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
CASE NO. SPOT 0500561 1 1  
000'76 
Likewise, if Esquivel had actually incriminated himself by making unwmed statements 
during the psychosexual evaluation that caused the Court to learn something it did not already 
know, the result may have been different on post-conviction. However, the fact is Esquivel made 
no incriminating statements and the Court learned nothing it did not already know; Esquivel 
proclaimed his innocence and did not cooperate in the psychosexual evaluation. He was not 
prejudiced by his counsel's actions. Therefore, the Court finds Esquivel cannot establish a 
reasonable probability that, but for his trial counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different as required by Strickland. 
CONCLUSION 
Having reviewed the Second Amended Petition and any evidence in a light most favorable 
to Esquivel, the Court finds that it is satisfied that Esquivel is not entitled to post-conviction relief. 
I.C. $19-4906(2) .  The Court further finds there is no dispute of material fact and no purpose 
would be served by any further proceedings. Therefore, by this order, the Court is indicating its 
intention to dismiss Esquivel's Petition. 
Esquivel and the State may reply to the Court's notice of the proposed dismissal within 20 
days. In light of his reply, if any, or any failure to reply, the Court may order the Second Amended 
Petition dismissed, grant leave to file an amended application or, direct that the proceedings 
otherwise continue. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 1 5th day of July 2008. 
Cheri C. Copsey d 
District Judge 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
I I Petitioner, Case No. SPOT 0500561 
ORDER DISMISSING 
SECOND AMENDED PETITION 
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
I I Defendant. I 
This Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is before the Court after the Court of Appeals in 
an unpublished decision affirmed the Court, in part, and, reversed it in part, and remanded the case 
for further proceedings consistent with the Court of Appeals' ruling. 
Upon remand, the Court appointed counsel on September 4, 2007, and held a status 
conference on November 29, 2007. On January 31, 2008, Esquivel filed a Second Amended 
Petition alleging ineffective counsel in Case No. H0300476, based on his claim that his counsel 
failed to advise him of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent during his psychosexual 
evaluation. Esquivel supported his Second Amended Petition with an affidavit from his trial 
counsel in which his trial counsel testified that he did not advise Esquivel of his Fifth Amendment 
right to remain silent. Esquivel also indicated no evidentiary hearing was necessary. 
The State moved to summarily dismiss Esquivel's Second Amended Petition on February 
13,2008, the Court heard oral argument on June 4,2008, and took the matter under advisement on 
June 11,2008. On July 15,2008, the Court conditionally dismissed Esquivel's Second Amended 
Petition and gave all parties twenty days to respond. Esquivel replied on August 5,2008. 
Having reviewed the Second Amended Petition and any evidence in a light most favorable 
to Esquivel, the Court finds that it is satisfied that Esquivel is not entitled to post-conviction relief. 
LC. $19-4906(2). The Court further finds there is no dispute of material fact and no purpose 
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1 11 would be served by any further proceedings. Therefore, the Court dismisses Esquivel's Second 
1 
I I Amended Petition. 
11 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
11 The State charged Esquivel with three counts of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Under 
4 I I Sixteen, Felony, I.C. $ 18- 1508 and one count of Sexual Abuse of a Minor, Felony, I.C. $ 18-1 506. 
5 I I At trial, the young victim testified that the sexual abuse began when she was eight years 




until she was ten years old when she began to avoid seeing Esquivel. Esquivel was her cousin's 
step-father. Once the abuse began, it continued and was repeated. The victim described her 
beddings as being wet after he would finish abusing her. She described in detail an attack that 




To avoid the continued sexual abuse, she stopped visiting her cousin who was her best 
fiiend. The child was traumatized and will never be the same. Esquivel's actions violated her trust 
12 
l4  1 1  At trial, the State attempted to introduce the CARES tape of the interview with the child 
and tore the entire family apart. Now sisters do not speak to one another. The child testified that 
she did not tell anyone until she became convinced Esquivel would begin abusing her cousin, his 
15 1 1  victim. At counsel's request, the Court viewed the tape and denied the State's request. The tape 
l6 11 demonstrated the consistencies in the child's testimony. 
l7 1 1  Esquivel testified at trial after being advised on the record of his Fifth Amendment right to 1 1  remain silent and M h e r  advised that anything he said could be used against him. More 
18 I I specifically, the Court advised him as follows: 
THE COURT: Now, you've indicated the defendant is going to testify. I 
want to make sure - I would like to inquire directly of the defendant. I need to 
make sure that you understand that you do have the right not to testify, but you also 
have the right to testify under our constitution and it is not for your attorney to 
decide whether you testify. You need to understand that anything you say on the 
stand can be used against you. So I need to inform you it is your decision to make 
it and it - I'm going to ask you at this time is it your decision to testifl today? 
I I THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is. 
2 4  1 1  Esquivel testified that he had not committed any of the acts testified to by' the child. He 
25 11 unequivocally denied responsibility for the crime. 
2 6 
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The jury found Esquivel guilty on all counts. The Court ordered a pre-sentence report and 
I I ordered a psychosexual evaluation. Esquivel's trial counsel testified on post-conviction that he did 
11 not advise Esquivel about his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent during the psychosexual 
1 1 evaluation. 
4 1 Esquivel made no incriminating statements to the psychosexual evaluator and, in fact, he 11 continued to deny responsibility, just as he had at trial. The statements he made to the examiner 
11 which were reported in the psychosexual evaluation were consistent with those made at trial. He 
6 
((did not complete a number of the tests causing the examiner to note that clinically significant 
7 
' I I information had been lost. The examiner also noted that Esquivel's continuing denial and lack of 
11 interest in sex offender treatment made him unacceptable for out-patient treatment. Based on these 
1 1  factors, the examiner opined that Esquivel was at a moderate risk to re-offend. 
l o  11 As Esquivel's trial attorney correctly noted at sentencing, when a defendant who has been 
l1 II found guilty of a sex offense continues to maintain innocence, the psychosexual examiner will 11 always conclude that the offender is at moderate risk to reoffend because he is not amenable to 
1 2  
1 1  treatment. 
l3 11 At the outset of the Court's pronouncement of sentence, the Court stated as follows: 
14 
15 
1 1  The Court continued for some time detailing the testimony it heard and why that testimony 
In particular, I've also relied very heavily on what happened in the trial 
itself, my own recollection of it, my own assessment of the credibility of the 
witnesses in arriving at this decision. . . . 
16 
17 
1 8  
20 11 suggested the child's testimony was credible and Esquivel's was not. See Transcript pp. 266-269. 
I want to make it clear that I sat through this trial. I also observed the 
CARES tape at the request of both counsel because there was a request to have the 
CARES tape introduced at some point in the trial which I denied, and what I found 
is that - I would make a specific finding that I found the child victim in this case 
quite credible. 
21 I I For example, the Court stated as follows: 
There were a couple of things that I found interesting. I know that the Defendant 
claims in this case the child in his view was coached, but in listening to her 
testimony both here in court and on the CARES tape, there were a couple of things 
that struck me. First, I noticed - that there was consistency, but it wasn't 
consistency like you see with someone who was coached. In my private practice I 
observed children who have been coached and one of the things that I noticed was 
that they repeat the exact same words over and over again. And, furthermore, the 
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other things that I have noticed with children who have been coached is generally 
they are coached to use a much more sophisticated set of words than I saw that 
Angie used. The words she used were the words of a young child and in many ways 
a child, even though she was older at the time she was testifying, they were the 
words of a child who is fairly - clear to the Court fairly unsophisticated. What I 
found particularly important is, as the prosecutor pointed out, she credibly 
described ejaculate. She described it as a wet bed. Now, if she were being coached, 
she would have described it differently and I think it is something that the jury 
picked up on. It's certainly something that I picked up on in listening to her. She 
did not seem to know what it was, but she described pretty accurately what it would 
be like if there was ejaculate on the bed. 
The Court carefully observed how consistent the child's testimony was, finding no evidence to 
suggest she had been coached. In particular, the Court noted that the child was able to describe the 
lubricant Esquivel used and where it was in his bedroom. The Court observed: 
Furthermore, I noticed that while the majority of the times that she said that 
she was sexually assaulted occurred in the one bedroom, there was one incident 
which she described in the master bedroom. I found that rather significant because 
the description in that case was significantly different. She was able to describe 
where the lubricant was kept, something a child normally would not even know 
about in going into a room unless she's seen someone take it down and use it in a 
specific way. Children, and, quite frankly, even I as an adult am not observant 
enough to notice when someone has lubricant in their bedroom, but she was able to 
describe that and describe how it was used. 
The Court also found that the child's difficulty in describing anatomical parts was consistent with 
her age and suggested she had not been coached, contrary to Esquivel's claims. 
When I looked at all those things, I came to the conclusion that contrary to 
what the Defendant says, this is not a child who's -who has been coached. This 
was a child who was, I think, credibly testifying to what she observed and as I 
indicated, she didn't really waiver too much in what she was describing and she had 
difficulty in describing the anatomical parts which I found to be interesting, too. 
The Court observed the real fear that the child victim experienced and noted that her 
manner of disclosure was consistent with the typical way in which these kinds of crimes are 
discovered. The Court stated as follows: 
I thought, again, her testimony was quite - was quite understandable and when I 
looked at the CARES tape, it was interesting, again, that she testified there that she 
was very - she was fearful for Marissa [her cousin] and that in part this is what 
caused her to come forward. I also found that the way in which the report came 
out, a spontaneous report at a friend's house with a person with whom she felt 
comfortable, is a fairly typical way things like this would come out and she made it 
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clear it was not something she wanted to do, she didn't plan it, and she didn't report 
to her adoptive mother, instead she reported to a friend, and a fiiend, like I said, that 
she felt comfortable with. She was obviously uncomfortable discussing it with her 
adoptive mother and I think in listening to her, that she was - it seemed to me 
anyway that she was concerned about the impact because she's not stupid, she's a 
very bright young person, the impact this potentially was going to have on her 
family. 
The Court also discussed the impact this crime would have on the victim and on her 
family. 
In looking at what she has written and what she testified to, it is clear that 
she is, still scared. This has impacted her in ways that will come out and unfold 
over the years. She has been changed forever. Hopefully she will survive this and 
become a stronger person. But let's make no bones about it, this is a young girl 
whose life has been changed forever and I would suggest that this entire family's 
life has been changed forever. It was an extreme violation of the child's trust and 
it's the result of a series and continual bad choices that I believe were made on the 
part of the Defendant. 
The Court also noted that while Esquivel's lack of cooperation with the psychosexual 
examiner could be consistent with someone who was innocent of the charges, his continued denial 
made treatment and rehabilitation problematic. The Court stated: "I will also note that I did take 
into account that his lack of amenability to treatment and also his clear use of illegal substances" 
including heroin. 
Given all of this, this Court imposed a thu-ty (30) year aggregate sentence with fifteen (1 5) 
year(s) fixed and fifteen (15) year(s) indeterminate on each of the three counts of Lewd Conduct 
with a Minor Under Sixteen. On the Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen, the Court 
imposed fifteen (1 5) years aggregate with five (5) years fixed and ten (1 0) years indeterminate. All 
sentences were to run concurrently. 
Esquivel moved the Court to reconsider, and the Court denied his Motion. Esquivel 
appealed and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the jury's verdict and the Court's sentence in an 
unpublished opinion. 
On July 15, 2005, Esquivel filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief, claiming ineffective 
trial counsel based on several allegations. On December 12, 2005, afler numerous motions, the 
Court dismissed his Amended Petition and Esquivel appealed. On August 3, 2007, in an 
unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Court in part and, reversed it in part, 
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1 11 of Appeals instructed this Court to appoint counsel to "assist Esquivel in pursuing the 
llpost-conviction claim that his counsel was ineffective in failing to arrange an independent 
1) psychosexual evaluation or otherwise mitigate the effects of the court-ordered evaluation." 
4 1 The Court appointed counsel to pursue the only remaining claim, ". . . that his counsel was 11 ineffective in failing to arrange an independent psychosexual evaluation or otherwise mitigate the 
6 
11 effects of the court-ordered evaluation," as provided by the Court of Appeals decision. Esquivel 
11 conduct an independent examination, he now asserts for the first time that his counsel was 
7 
1 )  ineffective because he failed to advise Petitioner that he could have simply chosen not to 
filed a Second Amended Petition and on remand, in addition to claiming his counsel was 
ineffective for failing to question the conduct of the exam or to request a different expert to 
1 o I I participate at all in the evaluation. 
l1 II Esquivel abandoned his claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to question the I I conduct of the psychosexual evaluation or to request a different expert to conduct an independent 
12 
l4 1 1  A petition for Post Conviction Relief can be filed at any time within one year from the 
13 
15 11 expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following appeal, 
examination, because he presented no argument or evidence regarding these claims to the Court. 
ANALYSIS 
l6 1 1  which ever is later. I.C. tj 19-4902. In this case, Esquivel was sentenced on January 13, 2004. The 
l7 I1 Court of Appeals affirmed his sentence on December 3, 2004, and filed the Remittitur March 2, 1 1  2005. Esquivel timely filed his post-conviction Petition on July 13,2005. 
18 
I I Esquivel appealed the Court's decision dismissing his Amended Petition and on August 3, 11 2007, in an unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Court in part and, reversed it 
20 11 in part, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with the Court of Appeals' ruling. In 
21 I I particular, the Court of Appeals ruled as follows: 
2 2 
2 3 
Esquivel's application, in essence, claims his trial counsel was deficient for failing 
to either question the conduct of the expert who performed the evaluation or request 
a different expert conduct a new psychosexual evaluation. . . . 
2 4 
2 5 
While we offer no opinion on the appropriateness of his trial counsel's conduct, the 
facts alleged by Esquivel, combined with the record, raises the possibility of a valid 
claim as to counsel's inaction regarding the psychosexual evaluation. . . . on 
2 6 
remand, we instruct the district court to appoint counsel to assist Esquivel in 
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to advise Petitioner he could have simply chosen not to participate at all in the 
evaluation. 
pursuing the post-conviction claim that his counsel was ineffective in failing to 
arrange an independent psychosexual evaluation or otherwise mitigate the effects of 
the court-ordered evaluation. 
(Emphasis in the opinion.) 
Esquivel filed a Second Amended Petition and on remand, in addition to claiming his 
4 
6 
The evaluation by Dr. Engle, among other things, indicates the Petitioner to 
not be a candidate for outpatient sex offender treatment, in part because of the 
Petitioner's denial during the examination, that he had sexually abused the alleged 
victim in the substantive case. 
counsel ineffective for failing to question the conduct of the exam or to request a different expert 
to conduct an independent examination, he now asserts for the first time that his counsel was 
ineffective because he failed 
'11 Petition with an affidavit from his trial counsel in which his trial counsel testified that he did not 
11 
" I I advise Esquivel of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent during the psychosexual evaluation. 
Esquivel relied on Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 563, 149 P.3d 833, 838 (2006), decided after 
this Court's decision dismissing his Amended Petition. Esquivel supported his Second Amended 
1 4  1 1  Esquivel also indicated no evidentiary hearing was necessary. 
l5 11 The State moved to summarily dismiss Esquivel's Second Amended Petition on February 
11 13, 2008, and filed additional argument on June 4, 2008. Esquivel filed argument on April 7, 11 2008. The Court heard oral argument on June 4,2008, and took the matter under advisement. 
1 7  
18 
l9 
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An application for post-conviction relief is in the nature of a civil proceeding, entirely 
distinct from the underlying criminal proceeding. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 798, 25 P.3d 





civil action, however, because an application must contain much more than "a short and plain 
statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). Hernandez v. 
State, 133 Idaho 794,797, 992 P.2d 789, 792 (Ct. App. 1999). The application must present or be 
accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject 
to dismissal. Id. Finally, a petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which his claims are based. I.C.R. 57(c).' 
In this case, Esquivel's claim is ineffective counsel. Esquivel does not claim the sentence 
1 I  imposed was illegal or that there were any grounds to suppress evidence. 
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Standard. 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an applicant for post-conviction 
Itrelief must demonstrate (I) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of 
6  ( 1  reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result 
7 
would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1 984); Estrada v. 
State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006). 
First, to establish a deficiency, Esquivel has the burden of showing that his attorney's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Matthews v. State, 136 Idaho 
46, 49, 28 P.3d 387, 390 (Ct. App. 2001); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 
l3 1 1  silent or right to not participate in a court ordered psychosexual evaluation. Estrada, 143 Idaho at 
1 2  
l4 1 1  564, 149 P.3d at 839. Esquivel's attorney testified that he did not inform Esquivel of his right to 
1176 (1988). As the Estrada court held, an attorney's performance falls below the objective 
standard of reasonableness and is thus deficient if he fails to inform his client of the right to remain 
15 11 remain silent during the psychosexual evaluation. Thus, Esquivel has proven by a preponderance 
by the deficient advice. 
Second, in order to succeed on post-conviction, Esquivel must show, bv a preponderance 
of the evidence, that he was actually prejudiced by his attorney's deficiency or, in this case, that his 
sentence would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92; Ramirez v. State, 119 Idaho 
1037, 1041, 812 P.2d 75 1, 755 (Ct. App.1991). "To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a 
reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial 
would have been different." Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 81, 57 P.3d 787, 792 (2002) 
(quoting Jakoski v. State, 136 Idaho 280, 282, 32 P.3d 672, 674 (Ct. App.2001)). In other words, 
1 6  
1 7  
of the evidence that his attorney's advice, or lack of advice, was deficient. That does not end the 
inquiry. The Estrada court did not change the requirement that Esquivel prove he was prejudiced 
25 
2 6  
I I.C.R. 57(c). Burden of Proof. The petitioner shall have the burden of proving the petitioner's grounds for relief by a 
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it is not enough for Esquivel to simply show that the attorney's error had some conceivable effect 
on his sentence as virtually every act or omission of counsel would meet that test. Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 693. 
B. Esquivel cannot show the requisite prejudice. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Estrada recognized that prior to sentencing, the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel apply 
6 
7  
lo 1 1  However, the Idaho Supreme Court did not change the long standing rule that even if a 
to psychosexual evaluations ordered by the court to be conducted prior to sentencing. Estrada, 
143 Idaho at 563-64, 149 P.3d at 838-389. An attorney's performance falls below the objective 
standard of reasonableness and is thus deficient if he fails to inform the client of the right to 
9 
II defendant proves the attorney failed to properly advise the defendant, the defendant must still 
remain silent or the right to not participate in a court ordered psychosexual evaluation. Estrada, 
143 Idaho at 564, 149 P.3d at 839. 
l5 1 1  in Strickland "In making this determination [referring to the prejudice prong], a court hearing an 
1 2  
13 
l 4  
prove by a preponderance of the evidence "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 565, 149 P.3d 
at 840 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). "[R]easonable probability is a probability sufficient 
to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. And as the United States Supreme Court continued 
1 in order to support a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel as follows: 
, 
1 7  
An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting 
aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the 
judgment. CJ: United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364-365, 101 S.Ct. 665, 
667- 668,66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981). The purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee 
I of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify 
reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, any deficiencies in 
counsel's performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute 
ineffective assistance under the Constitution. 
ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury." 466 U.S. 
at 696. The United States Supreme Court in Strickland carefully analyzed the prejudice required 
I I preponderance of the evidence. 2 6 
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It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable 
effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Virtuallv evew act or omission of counsel 
would meet that test, c j  United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 866- 
867, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3446-3447, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982), and not every error that 
conceivablv could have influenced the outcome undermines the reliability of the 
result of the proceeding. Respondent suggests requiring a showing that the errors 
"impaired the presentation of the defense." Brief for Respondent 58. That 
standard, however, provides no workable principle. Since any error, if it is indeed 
an error, "impairs" the presentation of the defense, the proposed standard is 
inadequate because it provides no way of deciding what impairments are 
sufficiently serious to warrant setting aside the outcome of the proceeding. 
466 U.S. at 691 -93 (emphasis added). 
Significantly, the United States Supreme Court in addressing the prejudice component of 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim makes the following observation: 
Although we have discussed the performance component of an ineffectiveness 
claim prior to the prejudice component, there is no reason for a court deciding an 
ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to 
address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient 
showing on one. In particular, a court need not determine whether counsel's 
performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered bv the 
defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. The object of an ineffectiveness 
claim is not to grade counsel's performance. If it is easier to dispose of an 
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect 
will often be so, that course should be followed. Courts should strive to ensure that 
ineffectiveness claims not become so burdensome to defense counsel that the entire 
criminal justice system suffers as a result. 
466 U.S. at 697 (emphasis added). 
Because this case is not one where prejudice is presumed,2 Esquivel must affirmatively 
prove prejudice. Actual ineffectiveness claims alleging a deficiency in attorney performance, such 
as Esquivel's, are inherently fact sensitive. Because errors by counsel are just as likely to be 
harmless in a particular case as they are to be prejudicial, they cannot be classified according to 
likelihood of causing prejudice. They must be considered on a case-by-case basis. See Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 693. In order to properly consider Esquivel's claim, the Court must analyze Estrada 
and compare the Estrada facts to those here. 
- - 
In certain contexts prejudice is presumed. These include: actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel 
altogether, state interference with counsel's assistance, and actual conflicts of interest. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
692. None of these apply in Esquivel's case. 
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1 1  which he testified repeatedly that he was innocent after being properly advised of his right to 
1 
11 remain silent. 
The facts in Estrada are important. In Estrada, unlike this case, the defendant pled guilty, 
thus admitting responsibility. Esquivel, on the other hand, was found guilty after a jury trial in 
4 1 1  Moreover, Estrada was initially uncooperative in the psychosexual evaluation and, in fact, 
1 1  he wrote to the district court, asserting that the evaluation was unnecessary and caused a frustrating 11 delay in his sentencing. Estrada's attorney responded by writing a letter to Estrada advising him 
6 1 1  that the evaluation was not a delay tactic, but "must be completed before sentencing." The 
7 
lo 1 1  Later, however, Estrada again became uncooperative and failed to complete certain 
8 
l1 II evaluation forms, which prompted the evaluator to contact Estrada's attorney to relay Estrada's 
attorney also commented, "I want every single good piece of evidence that I can get my hands on 
to be able to argue at your sentencing." Based on the letter, Estrada decided to participate in the 
evaluation. 
l3 11 your lack of cooperation to mean that you are not willing to comply with court orders." 
1 2  
l4 1 1  Thereafter, Estrada participated in the evaluation, which took place in the county jail. The 
refusal to cooperate. The attorney sent Estrada another letter, in which he noted that the evaluation 
was ordered by the district court. The attorney wrote, "We would not want the judge to consider 
1 )  complete psychometric testing making the evaluator conclude that "clinically significant 
1 8  
1 5  
1 6  
17 
11 information had been lost." He maintained his innocence throughout the testing, made no 
evaluation was filed with the district court and included a number of unfavorable and derogatory 
comments about Estrada, including references to his potential for future violent actions. 
Unlike Estrada, Esquivel never cooperated in his psychosexual evaluation. He refused to 
2 2  11 psychosexual evaluation and its finding that Estrada was a violent person and clearly relied on it in 
1 9  
2  1 
j 3  I1 arriving at the sentence, that did not happen in this case. In this case, the only reason this Court 
incriminating statements and, in fact, the reported statements in the evaluation are consistent with 
those he made at trial. 
While in Estrada the sentencing judge3 made specific, repeated references to the 
25 
2 6 
3 The judge who decided the post-conviction petition in Estrada was a different judge. Therefore, any findings by the 
post-conviction judge were not based on personal knowledge, unlike in this case. 
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discussed the psychosexual evaluation at all was because the Court had ordered the evaluation. 
This Court, at sentencing, only noted several times that Esquivel continued to maintain his 
innocence during the psychosexual evaluation causing the evaluator to conclude that he was not 
amenable to treatment placing him at moderate risk to reoffend. However, the Court already knew 
he was not amenable to rehabilitation, because he denied culpability at trial. The psychosexual 
evaluation itself added no new information to what this Court already knew based on Esquivel's 
testimony at trial. In fact, his lack of participation in the psychosexual evaluation was predictable 
given his trial testimony.4 In view of Esquivel's testimony, there is nothing in the psychosexual 
evaluation that could have affected the Court's sentence. 
While the Court of Appeals suggests in its decision that the mention5 of the psychosexual 
evaluation implied that the Court relied on the report, that is not the case. This Court determined 
Esquivel's sentence based on the testimony he gave and the evidence produced at trial and not on 
the psychosexual evaluation. The psychosexual evaluation did not increase or reduce his sentence. 
Esquivel did not receive a different sentence, either enhanced or reduced, based on his refusal to 
cooperate in the psychosexual evaluation or because of its contents. It was his failure to accept 
responsibility that demonstrated rehabilitation was unlikely. 
It is well established that Idaho trial courts may consider a defendant's failure to accept 
responsibility in determining whether rehabilitation efforts would be fruitful when imposing 
sentence. See State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 494, 988 P.2d 715, 720 (Ct. App.1999); State v. 
Brown, 131 Idaho 61, 73, 95 1 P.2d 1288, 1300 (Ct. App.1998); State v. Wheeler, 129 Idaho 735, 
932 P.2d 363 (Ct. App.1997); State v. Smith, 127 Idaho 632,903 P.2d 1329 (Ct. App.1995); State 
v. Fertig, 126 Idaho 364, 883 P.2d 722 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Nooner, 1 14 Idaho 654, 656, 759 
P.2d 945, 947 (Ct. App.1988). A trial court may consider the failure to take responsibility for 
4 Following this sentencing, the Court no longer orders psychosexual evaluations where the defendant either testifies 
that he is innocent or enters an Alford plea, because the result is predictable, just as Esquivel's attorney opined at 
Esquivel's sentencing. 
At sentencing trial courts frequently identify those things the court has read or reviewed. A trial court is required to 
reflect on everything in a pre-sentence report and cannot simply ignore material. That does not mean, however, those 
items become factors in the sentence. For example, the trial court reads and considers the numerous letters often 
received in support of a defendant or letters from victims but that does not mean those letters change the sentence in 
every case. 
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crimes committed in considering the defendant's potential for rehabilitation. See Murphy, 133 
Idaho at 494,988 P.2d at 720. That is what happened here. 
In reviewing the record, it is clear that this Court's references to the psychosexual 
evaluation were limited to its conclusion regarding Esquivel's amenability to treatment and 
rehabilitation, a matter long held to be appropriate to sentencing, and a conclusion clearly 
predicted by his own testimony at trial. Therefore, Esquivel cannot establish that this Court's 
exercise of its discretion in considering his lack of amenability to treatment and in sentencing was 
caused by any violation of his Fifih Amendment rights; he cannot prove prejudice, the second 
prong of Strickland. 
Likewise, if Esquivel had actually incriminated hmself by making unwarned statements 
during the psychosexual evaluation that caused the Court to learn something it did not already 
know, the result may have been different on post-conviction. Esquivel was clearly exercising h s  
constitutional rights and the Court did not hold that against him. However, the fact is Esquivel 
made no incriminating statements and the Court learned nothing it did not already know; Esquivel 
continued to proclaim his innocence and did not cooperate in the psychosexual evaluation. He was 
not prejudiced by his counsel's actions. Therefore, the Court finds Esquivel cannot establish a 
reasonable probability that, but for h s  trial counsel's unprofessional errors, the sentence would 
have been different as required by Strickland. 
CONCLUSION 
Having reviewed the Second Amended Petition and any evidence in a light most favorable 
to Esquivel, the Court finds that it is satisfied that Esquivel is not entitled to post-conviction relief. 
I.C. $19-4906(2). The Court W h e r  finds there is no dispute of material fact and no purpose 
would be served by any further proceedings. Therefore, by this order, the Court dismisses 
Esquivel's Petition. At the same time, the Court has ordered the psychosexual evaluation removed 
from the pre-sentence report in Case No, H0300476 and sealed. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 12" day of September, 2008. 
& c h  
Cheri C. Copsey 
District Judge 
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( 1  AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF as notice pursuant to Rule 77(d) 
1 
I I I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes addressed as follows: 
I, J. David Navarro, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that on September / b , 
2008 I mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the ORDER DISMISSING SECOND 
GREG H. BOWER 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
JEAN FISHER 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
200 W. FRONT STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702-5954 
LAYNE DAVIS 
DAVIS & WALKER 
200 NORTH 4TH STREET, SUITE 302 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
Ada Wty,-ldaho 
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DAVIS & WALKER 
200 North 4th Street, Suite 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 429- 1200 
Facsimile: (208) 429- 1 100 
Idaho State Bar No. 4640 
Conflict Counsel for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CARLOS ESQUIVEL, 1 
1 Case No. SPOT 05-00561 
Petitioner, ) 
1 NOTICE OF APPEAL 
VS. 1 
1 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 
Respondent. ) 
TO: ALL PARTIES, THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, AND THE CLERK OF THE 
ABOVE ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Petitioner, Carlos Esquivel, appeals against the above named 
Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court fiom District Court in the Judgment and Order 
Dismissing Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, entered in the above-entitled 
action on September 16,2008, the Honorable Judge Cheri Copsey presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
Judgments or Orders described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable Orders under and pursuant 
to Rule 11 (c) I.A.R. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 1 
00095 
A 
3. Whether the denial for the Petitioner's Post Conviction Relief application violated 
the procedural and substantive due process standards guaranteed by the U.S. and Idaho 
Constitutions. 
4. An order dated September 15,2008 removed the psychosexual evaluation from 
the pre-sentence report and further ordered that it be sealed. No Order has been entered sealing 
any portion of the record. 
5. A reporter's transcript is requested. 
6.  Petitioner, Carlos Esquivel, requests the preparation of the following portions of 
the reporter's transcript: The entire standard transcript as defined in Idaho Appellant Rules 
25(a). In addition to the standard transcript, the Appellant requests the preparation of the 
reporter's transcript for the Evidentiary Hearing held on June 4,2008. 
7. I certify: 
a. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set 
out below: 
1. Kim Madsen, 200 W. Front St., Boise, Idaho 83 702 ' 
b. That Petitioner, Carlos Esquivel, is exempt from paying the estimated 
transcript fee because he is an indigent person. 
c. That Petitioner, Carlos Esquivel, is exempt from paying the estimated fee 
for preparation of the record because he is an indigent person. 
d. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Idaho Appellant Rules Rule 20 and the Attorney General. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 2 
. 
,)" 4 
'DATED this & day of October, 2008. 
DAVIS & WALKER 
BY 
Layne Davis 
Conflict Counsel for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE 0 6  SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the of October, 2008,I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Ada County Prosecutor's Office 
200 W. Front St., Rrn. 3191 
Boise, ID 83702 
Kim Madsen 
Court Reporter 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney General's Office 
Statehouse, Room 2 10 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-00 10 
[ 1 U.S. MAIL 
HAND DELIVERED 
[ 1 FACSIMILE 




[ 1 OVERNIGHT MAIL 
U.S. MAIL 
C 1 HAND DELIVERED 
[ 1 FACSIMILE 
[ 1 OVERNIGHT MAIL 
State of Idaho U.S. MAIL 
Office of State Appellant Public Defender [ 1 HAND DELIVERED 
3647 Lake Harbor Ln. 1: 1 FACSIMILE 
Boise, ID 83703 [ 1 OVERNIGHT MAIL 
DAVIS & WALKER 
BY 
Layne Davis 
Conflict Counsel for Petitioner 
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Layne Davis 
DAVIS & WALKER 
200 North 4' Street, Suite 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 429- 1200 
Facsimile: (208) 429- 1 100 
Idaho State Bar No. 4640 
Conflict Counsel for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CARLOS ESQUIVEL, 1 
) Case No. SPOT 05-00561 
Petitioner, 1 
) MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT TO 
VS. 1 APPOINT STATE APPELLATE 
1 PUBLIC DEFENDER 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. 1 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, Carlos Esquivel, by and through his attorney of record, 
Layne Davis of Davis & Walker, conflict counsel for the Ada County Public Defender's Office, 
and hereby moves this Honorable Court to appoint the State Appellate Public Defender's Office 
to represent the above-named Petitioner in the above-entitled matter for the reasons set forth in 
this Affidavit attached hereto. 
rd 
DATED this &? day of October, 2008. 
DAVIS & WALKER 
BY * 
Layne Davis 
Conflict Counsel for Petitioner 
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STATE OF IDAHO 1 
1ss 
County of Ada' 1 
LAYNE DAVIS, first being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am an attorney with Davis & Walker, conflict counsel for the Ada County 
Public Defender's Office, in this case. 
2. Counsel for the above-named Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal from the Order 
Denying Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, entered in the above-entitled action on October 23, 
2008. 
3. The general practice in the Ada County Public Defender's Office, as well as in 
our office as conflict counsel for the Public Defender, is to submit a Motion and Order 
appointing State Appellate Public Defender concurrently with filing the Notice of Appeal on 
appeals filed after September 15, 1998. 
4. Ada County is participating fully in the State Appellate Public Defender program. 
5 .  Petitioner is entitled to counsel on appeal and is entitled to the services of the 
State Appellate Public Defender. 
DAVIS & WALKER 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO 
Layne Davis 
Conflict Counsel fyr Petitioner 
..I before me on this& day of October, 2008. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 33%~ of October, 2008,I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Ada County Prosecutor's Office 
200 W. Front St., Rm. 3 191 
Boise, ID 83702 
Kim Madsen 
Court Reporter 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney General's Office 
Statehouse, Room 2 10 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-00 10 
[ 1 U.S. MAIL - HAND DELIVERED 
[ 1 FACSIMILE 
[ 1 OVERNIGHT MAIL 
U.S. MAIL 
[ 1 HAND DELIVERED 
[ 1 FACSIMILE 
[ 1 OVERNIGHT MAIL 
U.S. MAIL 
[ 1 HAND DELIVERED 
[ 1 FACSIMILE 
[ 1 OVERNIGHT MAIL 
State of Idaho U.S. MAIL 
Office of State Appellant Public Defender [ 1 HAND DELIVERED 
3647 Lake Harbor Ln. [ 1 FACSIMILE 
Boise, ID 83703 [ 1 OVERNIGHT MAIL 
DAVIS & WALKER 
BY 
Layne Davis 
Conflict Counsel for Petitioner 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT TO APPOINT STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER - Page 3 ool'oo 
Layne Davis 
DAVIS & WALKER 
200 North 41h Street, Suite 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 429-1 200 
Facsimile: (208) 429- 1 100 
Idaho State Bar No. 4640 
OCT 2 8 2008 
Conflict Counsel for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CARLOS ESQUIVEL, ) 
1 Case No. SPOT 05-0056 1 
Petitioner, 1 
1 ORDER APPOINTING STATE 
vs . ) APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
1 ON DIRECT APPEAL 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
1 
Respondent. 1 
The above-named Petitioner, Carlos Esquivel, being indigent and having heretofore been 
represented by the Ada County Public Defender's Office in the District Court, and said 
Petitioner/Appellant having elected to pursue a direct appeal in the above-entitled matter; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, that the Idaho State 
Appellate Public Defender is appointed to represent the above-named PetitionerIAppellant, 
Carlos Esquivel, in all matters pertaining to the direct appeal. 
F 
DATED this a$ *day of October, 2008. 
BY ~ L A L L  
The Honorable i:dge &eri Copsey 
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STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 35792 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 8th day of December, 2008. 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
BR/\.nll..EY J. THlES " .  
BY 
Deputy Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
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STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 35792 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, the undersigned authority, do hereby certiQ that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO BOISE, IDAHO 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
Date of Service: 
DEC 0 9 2098 
BY 
BRADLEV J -  TMlES 
Deputy Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 35792 
CERTEICATE TO RECORD 
I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true 
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
24th day of October, 2008. 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
BY 
Deputy Clerk 
